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ABSTRACT 
 
In the United States today, the behavior of the political branches is generally viewed as 
more damaging to the American constitutional system than is the behavior of the federal courts. 
Yet constitutional law scholarship continues to focus primarily on judges and judging. This 
Article suggests that such scholarship should develop for presidents and members of Congress 
what it has long advocated for judges: a role morality that imposes normative limits on the 
exercise of official discretion over and above strictly legal limits. The Article first grounds a role 
morality for federal elected officials in two purposes of the U.S. Constitution whose vindication 
requires more than compliance with legal rules: securing the American conception of democracy 
as collective self-governance and creating a reasonably well-functioning federal government. 
Given its close connection to those purposes, a role morality for presidents and members of 
Congress is appropriately described as constitutional, not merely political. This Article then 
proposes some rhetorical, procedural, and substantive components of constitutional role 
morality, including a commitment to consult the political opposition before taking important 
actions and a rebuttable presumption in favor of moderation and compromise. The Article also 
explains how different actors in the American constitutional system should execute their 
professional responsibilities if they are to make it more, rather than less, likely that such a role 
morality will eventually be adopted and maintained. A final part anticipates objections, including 
the concern that the vision offered here faces significant implementation problems.  
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When Rome was in danger, it was the cackling of the sacred geese that saved the 
Capitol. I am only a professorial goose, consecrated with a cap and gown and fed 
at a college table; but cackling is my job, and cackle I will.1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Since at least the mid-twentieth century, constitutional law scholarship in the United 
States has focused on the role of federal judges, not on the role of elected officials. Liberal 
academics and scholarly judges had defended the constitutionality of the New Deal by arguing 
that the judiciary should respect the democratically accountable decision-making of the political 
branches on matters of social and economic regulation.2 Those liberals struggled to reconcile 
their commitment to judicial deference in that sphere with the assertive judicial responses to 
issues of civil rights and liberties that later arose.3 
The anxieties of the leading lights of that scholarly generation, most notably Learned 
Hand4 and Felix Frankfurter,5 made a lasting impact on their students in the next one. In 1962, 
Alexander Bickel famously wrote that the U.S. Supreme Court was a “deviant institution in the 
American democracy.”6 He coined the phrase “the counter-majoritarian difficulty” to name the 
perceived problem of democratic legitimacy that arose when unelected judges told popular 
majorities they were not permitted to govern as they preferred.7 Bickel’s distinction between 
countermajoritarian courts and majoritarian presidents and Congresses would subsequently cast a 
long intellectual shadow. As Barry Friedman observes, constitutional law scholars since Bickel 
have been in the grip of an “academic obsession” with the countermajoritarian difficulty.8 Much 
modern scholarship in constitutional law accepts the Bickelian dichotomy between federal 
judges who are unelected and so (it is assumed to follow) do not represent “majority will,” and 
politicians who stand for election and so (it is assumed to follow) do represent majority will.9 All 
                                                
1 R.G. COLLINGWOOD, AN ESSAY ON METAPHYSICS 343 (1940). I thank Jeff Powell for this reference. 
2  See generally, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 160–61, 228–36 (2002). 
3 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Friedman, supra note 2, at 202-15 (discussing Warren 
Court school prayer, reapportionment, and criminal procedure decisions).   
4 See generally LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES (1958).  
5 See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 648 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(rejecting the so-called double standard of judicial review in stating that “[o]ur power does not vary according to the 
particular provision of the Bill of Rights which is invoked”). 
6  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS 16 (1962). 
7 Id. at 18. 
8 See Friedman, supra note 2, at 157 (discussing “the intellectual problem of justifying judicial review that 
has gripped the academy nonstop since the early 1940s”). See also, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: 
THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1982) (“The central issue in the constitutional debate of the past twenty-five years 
has been the legitimacy of judicial review of constitutional questions by the United States Supreme Court.”). 
9 See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 630 (1993) (observing that 
“[t]he countermajoritarian difficulty posits that the ‘political’ branches are ‘legitimate’ because they further majority 
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such scholarship assumes that, in the American constitutional system, it is the proper role of 
federal judges, not elected officials, that requires a normative account. 
 The same assumption animates constitutional law scholarship that imagines it has moved 
on from Bickel. Such scholarship accepts all of the political science evidence establishing that 
the Supreme Court is far more majoritarian, 10  and the political branches are far less 
majoritarian, 11  than Bickel and his intellectual heirs imagined. Among constitutional law 
scholars, however, that learning has been thought relevant mostly to theorizing about judicial 
review,12 putting aside Sanford Levinson’s calls for constitutional redesign.13 The focus tends to 
remain on judges, both the formal rules courts make for other actors, and the less formal norms 
that govern judges themselves.14 The most consistent theme in the literature is law in judicial 
hands, implemented through judicial procedures, with consequent attention to judicial role.15   
                                                                                                                                                       
will, while courts are illegitimate because they impede it”). John Hart Ely wrote that “we may grant until we’re blue 
in the face that legislatures aren’t wholly democratic, but that isn’t going to make courts more democratic than 
legislatures.” JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 67 (1980). He deemed 
“ludicrous” efforts to justify judicial review based on the idea that “the legislature does not truly speak for the 
people’s values, but the Court does.” Id. at 68. “There can be no doubt,” he repeated, “that the judicial branch, at 
least at the federal level, is significantly less democratic than the legislative and executive.” Id. at 206 n.9. Larry 
Kramer also deemed it “ludicrous” to think legislatures and courts are “comparable” in how much they “mirror or 
translate popular will.” Larry Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 999 (2004).  
10  Most political scientists reject Bickel’s premise that judicial review presents a countermajoritarian 
difficulty. For a discussion, see HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER, & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT 20-21 (2d ed. 2016). Prominent works include THOMAS R. 
MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE REHNQUIST COURT (2008); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (2007); THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989); 
MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1966); Kevin T. McGuire & 
James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to 
Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018 (2004); and Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme as 
a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957). Important legal scholarship similarly contests the premise of a 
countermajoritarian Court. See generally, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION 
HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009); Jack M. Balkin 
& Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001). For skepticism that 
the Court is “majoritarian,” see generally Richard Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 
SUP. CT. REV. 103, 117 (2010); Neil S. Siegel, A Coase Theorem for Constitutional Theory, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
583 (2010) (analyzing Friedman’s The Will of the People). 
11  For discussions of political branch countermajoritarianism, see generally SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR 
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN 
CORRECT IT) (2006); PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 147–51 (6th ed. 2015); Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 GEORGETOWN L.J. 
113, 144–157 (2012).  
12 See generally, e.g., ELY, supra note 9; Lain, supra note 11.  
13 See generally LEVINSON, supra note 11. 
14  There are, of course, exceptions. Paul Brest argues that conscientious legislators should regard 
themselves as more legally constrained than a court is prepared to demand of them. See generally Paul Brest, The 
Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975). Robin West urges 
progressives to turn from the “adjudicated Constitution” to the “legislated Constitution, the Constitution looked to 
by the conscientious legislator as he or she seeks to fulfill her political obligations.” Robin West, The Missing 
Jurisprudence of the Legislated Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 at 79 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel 
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Among academic constitutional lawyers, a role morality is widely deemed applicable to 
federal judges. That role morality is intended to discipline judges beyond strictly legal restraints 
on their behavior.16 Critically, however, judicial role morality is tied to a sense of the proper 
place of judges in the constitutional scheme. For example, legal scholars write that federal judges 
are supposed to possess reasons for their decisions and to offer them as justification for those 
decisions, at least most of the time. Judges are supposed to be relatively constrained in their 
decision-making and to proceed consistently and incrementally, at least most of the time. They 
are supposed to worry about the countermajoritarian difficulty, perhaps regardless of the truth 
value of Bickelian assertions. Judges are supposed to maintain the appearance (and reality) of 
impartiality. Particular judges are celebrated for having possessed sound judgment and practiced 
the virtue of statesmanship. When judges issue decisions to which Americans vigorously object, 
their objections are unlikely to be dismissed by constitutional law scholars with conversation 
stoppers like “appointments have consequences” or “it’s just judging” to issue such decisions.  
By contrast, academic constitutional lawyers do not generally write that a role morality 
should guide presidents and members of Congress. Following Bickel’s contemporary, Herbert 
Wechsler, the field tends to view “politics” in America as an unprincipled realm in which elected 
                                                                                                                                                       
eds., 2009). Vicki Jackson defends the normative concept of “pro-constitutional” legislative representatives—that is, 
“representatives whose goals are to advance the purposes of constitutional democracy within their own 
constitutional system.” Vicki C. Jackson, Pro-Constitutional Representation: Comparing the Role Obligations of 
Judges and Elected Representatives in Constitutional Democracy, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1717, 1717–18 (2015). 
Bruce Ackerman’s theory of “constitutional moments” focuses on the role of the political branches in producing 
legitimate constitutional change and de-emphasizes the role of judges. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE, VOLUME 1: FOUNDATIONS (1991); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME 2: TRANSFORMATIONS 
(1998); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME 3: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014). Akhil Amar’s 
scholarship also does not focus mostly on courts, let alone the legitimacy of judicial review. See generally, e.g., 
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005) [hereinafter AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION]; AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES 
WE LIVE BY (2012) [hereinafter AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION]. 
15 It is impossible to prove such a claim. For suggestive quantitative evidence based on citation counts, see 
generally Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
1483 (2012); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Books Published Since 1978, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 397 (2000). 
For suggestive qualitative evidence, consider the Foreword to the Harvard Law Review, the journal Supreme Court 
Review, the focus of most constitutional law casebooks and courses on Supreme Court decisions, and the judicial 
focus of most of the most influential works of constitutional law and theory since Bickel wrote The Least Dangerous 
Branch. A non-exhaustive list includes Herbert Wechsler’s famous “neutral principles” article, see infra note 17; 
John Hart Ely’s process-oriented theory of judicial review, see generally ELY, supra note 9; Philip Bobbitt’s famous 
modalities of constitutional argument, see generally BOBBITT, supra note 8; Ronald Dworkin’s work on legal 
interpretation, see generally, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); David Strauss’s theory of common law 
constitutionalism, see generally, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010); Cass Sunstein’s theory 
of judicial minimalism in opinion writing, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL 
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999); and the rise of first- and second-generation originalism, see generally 
Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2013). Even work on the 
Constitution outside the courts focuses more on the relationship of social movements to judicial review than on their 
relationship to the political branches. See generally, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) [hereinafter 
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM]; FRIEDMAN, supra note 10; LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2005); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE 
COURTS (1999); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007).  
16 For a discussion of the claims made in this paragraph, see infra Part I.  
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officials are free to exercise their wills to whatever extent formal electoral processes have vested 
in them the legal authority to do so.17 When Americans voice objections to the employment of 
partisan political power, most constitutional law scholars qua scholars are likely to just shrug and 
conclude that the U.S. Constitution has nothing to do with the matter. 
There is a basic problem with the enduring hold of Bickelian thinking over constitutional 
law scholarship in the United States. Not only did Bickel internalize the conflicts of those who 
had struggled to reconcile their posture toward the judiciary during the New Deal with a world in 
which the subject matter of judicial decision-making had changed,18 but he also wrote less than a 
decade after Brown and before the political branches began enacting civil rights legislation 
aimed at disestablishing an apartheid social order. In such a period, the Court’s legitimacy was 
perceived to be in question.19 It is thus understandable why Bickel would have been worried 
about the Court’s potential countermajoritarianism, and about how to protect the Justices’ 
articulation of constitutional principles from being warped by the need to maintain the public 
legitimacy of the Court.20 Of course, the conduct and legitimacy of the Supreme Court remains 
worthy of extended scholarly attention and critique today. But Bickel’s time was very different 
from our own, and, as a result, so were his most acute anxieties.  
Consider some contemporary causes for concern. Americans today appear to be suffering 
from a collapsed understanding of politics. Both culturally and conceptually, they increasingly 
find themselves acting based upon an account of politics that verges on animus toward, and deep 
distrust of, fellow Americans in the other political party.21 They tend to view politics as a realm 
in which people are entitled to indulge their ideological appetites to the full extent legality 
permits—they are free to take maximum advantage in every situation. Too often, citizens 
imagine the American polity as populated by individuals who are so fundamentally alien from 
them—so “other”—that they are more charitably disposed toward a hostile foreign power than 
toward members of the other political party.22 “Those people,” the thinking seems to go, cannot 
                                                
17 Wechsler’s distinction between the principled realm of judicial decision and the unprincipled realm of 
political decision still resonates among constitutional law scholars. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral 
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1959) (“[W]hether you are tolerant, perhaps more tolerant 
than I, of the ad hoc in politics, with principle reduced to a manipulative tool, are you not also ready to agree that 
something else is called for from the courts? I put it to you that the main constituent of the judicial process is 
precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching 
judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved.”).  
18 See Friedman, supra note 2, at 160–61, 228–36.  
19 See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 43 
(1995) (“Brown represented a courageous gamble.”). 
20 See BICKEL, supra note 6, at 111–98 (advocating that the Court deploy “the passive virtues,” such as 
standing doctrine, to protect legal principles from being distorted by the necessity of preserving public legitimation).  
21  See, e.g., Frank Bruni, I’m O.K.—You’re Pure Evil, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/17/opinion/sunday/im-ok-youre-pure-
evil.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=opinion-c-col-left-
region&region=opinion-c-col-left-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-left-region&_r=0 (“If not physically then 
civically, we’re in a dangerous place when it comes to how we view, treat and talk about people we disagree with. 
Ugly partisanship may not be new, but some of its expressions and accelerants are.”). 
22  See, e.g., Charles J. Sykes, The Danger of Ignoring Alex Jones, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/17/opinion/sunday/the-danger-of-ignoring-alex-
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be permitted to win the next election, or make the next Supreme Court appointment, or have their 
most important values or interests accommodated in any way, because so much is perceived to 
be at stake. Americans who are on the losing end of the most recent “razor’s edge” election feel 
something akin to estrangement from the federal government. 
Meanwhile, the federal government itself is increasingly dysfunctional; more often than 
not, elected officials are unable to cooperate across party lines in order to execute the basic 
responsibilities of the federal government in the constitutional scheme. For example, a 
Democratic Senate ended the filibuster for lower federal court nominees in 2013 after alleging 
unprecedented Republican obstruction.23 A Republican Senate did the same for Supreme Court 
nominees in 2017 in order to overcome a Democratic filibuster of Republican nominee Neil 
Gorsuch.24 Senate Republicans so acted after holding Justice Antonin Scalia’s seat open for 
roughly a year in order to prevent Democratic President Barack Obama from filling the vacancy 
by appointing Chief Judge Merrick Garland of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.25 
It remains to be seen whether it will again be possible to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court 
when the same political party does not control both the White House and the Senate.  
In the near term, at least, there seems little reason for optimism. For example, a 
Republican Senate recently approved highly consequential tax legislation without any 
Democratic input or even a single hearing, let alone the process that used to be followed: 
“multiple congressional hearings, proposed statutory language and detailed reports from the tax-
writing committees, all prepared well in advance of any vote” and “with the assistance of [Joint 
Committee on Taxation] staff and with the input of Treasury Department experts.”26 In addition, 
Republican President Donald J. Trump routinely flouts norms and conventions of proper 
governmental behavior that previously had constrained presidents of both parties.27 And the 
Democrats, for their part, recently held up urgent funding legislation in order to extract a deal 
                                                                                                                                                       
jones.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=opinion-c-col-left-
region&region=opinion-c-col-left-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-left-region (“We now have a politics deeply 
infused with paranoia and distrust not only of our institutions but also of one another.”). 
23 See Jeremy W. Winters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/politics/reid-sets-in-motion-steps-to-limit-use-of-filibuster.html. 
24 See Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy “Nuclear Option” to Clear Path for Gorsuch, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-
senate.html?_r=0. 
25 See Mike DeBonis, Judge Dashes Merrick Garland’s Final, Faint Hope for a Supreme Court Seat, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/11/18/judge-dashes-
merrick-garlands-final-faint-hope-for-a-supreme-court-seat/?utm_term=.b518d565f272. 
26 See, e.g., Edward Kleinbard, Senators Picked Americans’ Pockets Via Degraded Tax Policy Process, 
THE HILL (Dec. 4, 2017), http://thehill.com/opinion/finance/363096-senators-picked-americans-pockets-via-
degraded-tax-process. 
27 For discussions, see generally Neil S. Siegel, Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President 
Donald Trump. 93 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2018); Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
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that would offer a path to citizenship to beneficiaries of the program known as Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA); a shutdown of the federal government ensued.28 
Three characteristics of the problems discussed above stand out. First, they mostly 
implicate the convictions and conduct of the public and the political branches, not the courts. 
Second, they concern mindsets and behavior that, while ostensibly troubling, are not potentially 
illegal. And third, that behavior, even where not illegal, raises concerns that are properly 
denominated constitutional in the broad sense that they appear to call into question the long-term 
health of the American constitutional system. Given the nature and potential magnitude of those 
problems, it is time for constitutional law scholarship in the United States to escape the shadow 
of Bickel’s generation (and that of his teachers). To help address the problems of our situation, 
constitutional law scholars might follow the example of certain contemporary scholars of 
statutory interpretation by focusing a bit less on the judiciary and a bit more on the political 
branches.29 More specifically (and distinctively), constitutional law scholars might do for elected 
officials what they have long done for judges: contribute to the development of a constitutional 
role morality by identifying normative restraints on the discretion of politicians beyond the legal 
restrictions imposed by the Constitution and federal law. This Article is offered in that spirit.30 
What are the sources of a constitutional role morality for presidents and members of 
Congress? Where is one to look for a role morality that demands more than compliance with the 
law writ small? Rather than consult a general theory of morality or a political theory of 
representation or political ethics, this Article focuses on the American constitutional system in 
particular and suggests two good places to look. The first is a particular understanding of the 
American commitment to democracy, which has implications not just for First Amendment 
doctrine but also for the role responsibilities of representatives. As illuminated by the writings or 
examples of Rousseau, Burke, Madison, Washington, and Jefferson, American representatives 
have a duty to represent the whole and not just the part in order to manage the tension between 
democracy and diversity in a strikingly heterogeneous political community that is nonetheless 
committed to the ideal of collective self-governance. Such a community must confront the 
question of how, and under what circumstances, electoral losers can fairly be thought of as self-
governing. 31  The second source of a constitutional role morality rests upon a particular 
understanding of the requirements of good institutional citizenship in a robust separation of 
                                                
28 See, e.g., Caitlin Dickerson, What Is DACA? Who Are the Dreamers? Here Are Some Answers, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/23/us/daca-dreamers-shutdown.html.  
29 See generally, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013); 
Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of 
Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014). 
30 For the closest such effort, see generally Jackson, supra note 14. There are differences between Professor 
Jackson’s wonderful Essay and this Article. For example, this Article emphasizes the problem of minority self-
governance; articulates a role morality for both presidents and members of Congress; differently develops the 
contents of that role morality; and, most importantly, theoretically grounds a constitutional role morality for federal 
elected officials in specific purposes of the U.S. Constitution that legal rules alone cannot accomplish. Both pieces, 
however, “engage in a project central to the success of constitutional democracy—the normative reconstruction of 
representation.” Id. at 1788. 
31 For a discussion of this literature, see infra Part II.A.  
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powers regime that is not intended to impair the ability of the federal government to function at 
least tolerably well and that, in an era of polarization and distrust, increasingly threatens it with 
dysfunction. On that view, it is critical to keep partisanship in the political branches within 
reasonable bounds so that the federal government can fill executive and judicial offices, solve 
multi-state collective action problems that the states cannot solve on their own, and protect civil 
rights.32  
Both sources of a constitutional role morality speak directly to the actual circumstances 
of contemporary American political life: high levels of political polarization and ill will threaten 
to render the tension between democracy and diversity impossible to reconcile, and to render the 
federal government incapable of executing its basic responsibilities.33 More fundamentally, both 
sources of a role morality constitute basic purposes of the Constitution—facilitating collective 
self-governance and creating a functional federal government—that require more than 
compliance with legal rules if they are to be vindicated. When presidents and members of 
Congress respect the restraints imposed by constitutional role morality, they help accomplish 
those constitutional purposes. A constitutional role morality for elected officials can be thought 
of as occupying normative territory at the border between law and politics as conventionally 
conceived—that is, between a realm of “hard” restraints on the exercise of discretion by elected 
officials, and a realm of unlimited discretion by such officials. Official conduct that disregards 
role restraints is anticonstitutional, even if it is not unconstitutional. 
Specifying the contents of a constitutional role morality for elected officials poses a 
formidable challenge, in part because elections do and should have significant consequences for 
American governance. This Article nonetheless makes a preliminary attempt at identifying 
rhetorical, procedural, and substantive components of a role morality that can (modestly) limit 
the stakes of losing elections while still enabling the prevailing party to govern and the federal 
government to function effectively.34 The merits of the tentative proposals to follow, however, 
are not critical at this point. This Article is primarily concerned with starting a normative 
conversation, with showing that it is an important conversation, and with suggesting that 
constitutional law professors (in addition to other legal scholars) are at least apt participants in 
such conversations.  
Constitutional law scholarship that develops the idea of a role morality for members of 
the political branches will have implications for how different actors in the American 
constitutional system ought to execute their own responsibilities if they are to make it more, 
rather than less, likely that such a role morality will eventually be adopted and maintained.35 
Most obviously, politicians who are tempted to exercise partisan power in aggressive ways 
should consider not simply the legal authority that vests as a consequence of formal electoral 
processes, but also their potential obligations to represent the whole and not just the part, and to 
                                                
32 For development of this argument, see infra Part II.B.  
33 See, e.g., Philip Bump, Political Polarization Is Getting Worse. Everywhere, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/04/09/polarization-is-getting-worse-in-every-part-of-
politics/?utm_term=.f8ba11e60d0b.       
34 For a discussion, see infra Part III.B.   
35 For development of those points, see infra Part IV. 
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help the system function better and not worse. Although most politicians may be unlikely to 
practice normative self-restraint very often in the short-to-medium run, investing in civic 
education (contra current trends) could eventually have a positive impact on the constituents, 
donors, party officials, media outlets, and others who constitute the environment in which elected 
officials must function. And law teachers might consider operating within a longer time horizon 
and developing ways to instruct their students—in their capacities as future politicians, not just 
future judges—that a role morality applies to their own conduct. Law teachers might also engage 
their students as citizens, as well as future lawyers, and instruct them that high levels of 
polarization and animus between members of the two main political parties imperil the 
constitutional system. 
In the shorter term, there may be an implication for practices of political resistance. Few 
would accept aggressive judicial behavior lying down just in virtue of asserted justifications that 
“appointments have consequences” or “it’s just judging” for Supreme Court Justices to advance 
ideological agendas. Likewise, opposition politicians, members of the news media, the 
institutions of civil society, and concerned citizens need not simply accept assertions by those in 
power (or their supporters) that “elections have consequences” or that “it’s just politics” for 
elected officials to forcefully advance ideological agendas. Nor ought the opposition to limit its 
pushback to considering whether a president is “legitimate” or whether a president has a 
“mandate” to govern. Instead, the opposition should feel entitled to speak the language of 
constitutional legitimacy to exercises of partisan power when politicians act as if they owe 
nothing to Americans who did not vote for them and to the institutions in which they serve. 
Part I discusses the longstanding concern of constitutional law scholars with judicial role 
morality. Part II looks to the American commitment to democracy and the American 
constitutional structure for normative sources of a role morality for elected officials. Part III 
offers a preliminary sketch of the obligations of elected officials as part of their role morality. 
Part IV identifies role implications for politicians, law teachers, and Americans who oppose 
aggressive action by an administration or Congress. Part V anticipates objections.  
Before proceeding, two clarifications are in order. First, although this Article argues for 
role restraints on elected officials to combat extreme partisanship, it is important to bear in mind 
that, if the argument were accepted, politicians would still retain the ability to pursue various 
objectives consistent with their role morality, including goals they should feel morally obliged to 
accomplish for others.36 A constitutional role morality for elected officials should not be viewed 
as mostly constraining, any more than it should be so viewed for judges. Moreover, this Article 
will show that a constitutional role morality for politicians opens up new possibilities for more 
responsive and effective governance.  
Second, solutions to the problems of polarization in contemporary American politics 
obviously depend upon their causes. Because this Article does not examine those causes, it does 
not offer short-to-medium run solutions beyond civic education, which cannot hurt and might 
eventually help. Instead, the Article provides a normative account that can be discussed and 
debated on its own terms. If enough Americans find it attractive, solutions will come in time. 
                                                
36 See generally, e.g., West, supra note 14 (emphasizing the obligations of the conscientious legislator).   
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I. JUDICIAL ROLE MORALITY  
The efforts of constitutional law scholars to develop a role morality for judges, one that it 
linked to the perceived place of judges in the constitutional scheme, are sufficiently numerous 
and familiar that they risk not being recognized as related and as having that purpose. Those 
efforts may be described as a multi-generational scholarly and professional project of 
emphasizing constraining conceptions of a judge’s institutional role. Such conceptions are of 
course thought to include legal restraints on judicial conduct—for example, legal prohibitions on 
taking bribes or adjudicating cases when a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned 
or when specific kinds of bias, prejudice, or conflicts of interest can be shown to exist in fact.37 
But conceptions of judicial role are thought to impose more than just legal restraints on judges. 
Concerns about unduly assertive judicial conduct have caused constitutional law scholars and 
other members of the legal community to develop and advocate for operational limits on how 
judges exercise their discretion.  
Notably, proposed limits do not characteristically take the form of hard-edged legal 
claims. For example, one does not typically hear assertions to the effect that “it would be illegal 
for a judge to cast a vote against the constitutionality of a statute because she thinks the statute is 
bad policy.” Instead, one tends to encounter a number of important ideas that sound in a different 
register. As noted above, constitutional law scholars have long insisted that Supreme Court 
Justices face a “countermajoritarian difficulty,”38 and their insistence may play a role in limiting 
judicial discretion regardless of the truth value of the proposition. In addition, commentators 
emphasize the importance of judicial reason giving.39 They propose ways of disciplining judges 
to the virtue of consistency and securing related rule-of-law values from judicial decision 
making.40 They endorse particular approaches to constitutional interpretation and reject others 
based in part upon concerns about proper judicial role. 41  They insist on basic fairness to 
litigants.42 They criticize judges who they do not believe are maintaining an appearance or reality 
of impartiality off the bench.43 They advise judges to proceed incrementally.44 They defend the 
                                                
37 See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012) (identifying circumstances in which judicial recusal is required). 
38 See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text. 
39 See generally, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995).  
40 See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, 
Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1473, 1500 (2007) (discussing how 
best to “advance the goal of disciplining judges to the virtue of consistency”).  
41  See generally, e.g., BOBBITT, supra note 8 (identifying the kinds of arguments that participants in 
American constitutional discourse, especially judges, conventionally employ).  
42 See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Due Process, Fair Play, and Excessive Partisanship: A New Principle for 
Judicial Review of Election Laws, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 655, 686–93 (2017) (discussing the principle of “fair play”).  
43 See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, How Badly Is Neil Gorsuch Annoying the Other Supreme Court Justices?, NEW 
YORKER (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/how-badly-is-neil-gorsuch-annoying-
the-other-supreme-court-
justices?mbid=nl_170930_Daily&CNDID=48074089&spMailingID=12041378&spUserID=MTczODY1MTk3OD
M1S0&spJobID=1242559629&spReportId=MTI0MjU1OTYyOQS2 (criticizing the speech Justice Gorsuch gave to 
a conservative group at the Trump International Hotel in Washington, D.C., and the speech he delivered at the 
University of Louisville, where he was introduced by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell). Justice Ginsburg 
was also criticized for her comments about President Trump when he was the Republican nominee. See, e.g., 
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idea of “judicial restraint.”45 They expect judges to respect institutional norms of appropriate 
judicial conduct. 46  They criticize judges who behave in an intemperate fashion. 47  They 
underscore a number of judicial virtues—a sense of proportion, the practice of moderation, the 
exercise of sound judgment, and the possession of good timing and tact—that fall under the 
general heading of judicial statesmanship, which counsels judges to take some account of the 
conditions of a court’s own public legitimacy.48 Commentators also condemn judicial willfulness 
or “activism”—that is, unjustifiably assertive judicial decision making.49  
Few members of the legal community would recommend any of the foregoing ideas 
always or invariably. On the contrary, commentators proffer a variety of presumptions, 
exceptions, and countervailing considerations. To take the most obvious example, almost no one 
is prepared to argue that Brown v. Board of Education was wrongly decided, and Brown was of 
course not an exemplar of judicial restraint. 50  Even so, commentators frequently urge 
constraining ideas upon judges. What is more, they do so notwithstanding a lack of consensus 
about which ideas to push, both at a particular time and over time. Legal scholar Craig Green 
underscores the disagreements over judicial role that continuously unfold in history:  
[V]igorous debates over judicial role continue because judicial norms are flexible 
and change over time. Each new crop of judges, lawyers, and scholars must learn, 
experience, and consider issues of judicial role for themselves. At any point in 
time, certain notions of judicial role will be dominant, others subordinate, and 
others mired in competitive struggle. The legal community’s unending 
                                                                                                                                                       
Editorial, Justice Ginsburg’s Inappropriate Comments on Donald Trump, WASH. POST (July 12, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/justice-ginsburgs-inappropriate-comments-on-donald-
trump/2016/07/12/981df404-4862-11e6-bdb9-701687974517_story.html?utm_term=.364c6e5b79be. 
44 See generally, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 15 (articulating a theory of judicial minimalism in opinion 
writing).  
45  See generally, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis, and the Promotion of Judicial 
Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271 (2005) (arguing for a strong theory of judicial precedent on grounds of judicial 
restraint).  
46 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the 
Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEORGETOWN L.J. 255, 319–21 (2017) (discussing how the concepts of 
historical gloss and constitutional conventions relate to questions of judicial independence and power).  
47 For example, Justice Scalia, for all his gifts and influence, was capable of writing with a nastiness that 
arguably served neither himself nor the Court nor the country well. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 
2630 (2015) (“If, even as the price to be paid for a fifth vote, I ever joined an opinion for the Court that began [how 
the majority opinion does], I would hide my head in a bag.”).     
48 See generally, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959 (2008) 
(theorizing the phenomenon of judicial statesmanship and its relationship to professional legal reasoning); Robert 
Post, Theorizing Disagreement: Reconceiving the Relationship between Law and Politics, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1319 
(2010) (similar).  
49 See generally Craig Green, An Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 58 EMORY L.J. 1195 (2009). For 
a critique of how motivated political actors deploy activism rhetoric to mask substantive objections in process 
objections, see generally Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 555 (2010). 
Although it is important to call out manipulative use of activism rhetoric, such rhetoric can help fashion role 
restraints on judges. 
50 347 U.S. 483 (1954).   
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participation in cultural contests over judicial role is an under-appreciated 
precondition of our system of judicial discretion within limits.51  
Disagreement about which restraints to impose has not simply undermined the project of 
persuading federal judges to respect the limits of their appropriate role in the constitutional 
scheme. Disagreement has also helped construct the very role constraints whose contents are in 
question. Disagreement has also validated the general idea that such restraints exist. 
Constitutional law scholars, as well as law teachers more generally, seek to bring the 
above ideas closer to reality in a variety of ways. In their writing, they develop principles for 
judges to consider. They mobilize histories of judges who are thought to have exemplified good 
judging.52 They identify judicial decisions that form part of the legal “canon.”53 They critique 
judicial decisions that fall short of proposed principles, including decisions that they identify as 
anticanonical.54 They challenge their students (future judges among them) to consider what good 
and bad judging looks like in a variety of settings. In all of those efforts, judicial biographies and 
judicial decisions serve as case studies of success or human frailty in executing the 
responsibilities of the judicial role.55 And judges themselves serve as educators by teaching 
lessons about judicial role to their law clerks,56 some of whom will go on to become judges.57 
                                                
51 Craig Green, What Does Richard Posner Know About How Judges Think?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 625, 661–62 
(2010) (emphasis added) (reviewing RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008)). 
52 See generally, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING 
AMERICAN JUDGES (3rd ed. 2007); Green, supra note 51, at 627 (“As White’s book illustrates, judicial methods 
emerge from complex interactions among society, politics, and biography. Thus, the strongest determinants of how 
judges think may be the historical stories and principles through which the legal community celebrates judicial 
heroes and triumphs, while condemning villains and failures.”). 
53 See generally, e.g., J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 964 (1998) (calling for a revitalized constitutional canon, one that is less centered on decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court).       
54 See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 379 (2011) (defining the “anticanon” as 
“the set of cases whose central propositions all legitimate decisions must refute”).  
55 See Green, supra note 51, at 646 (“Our history-laden system of legal education places questions of 
judicial role front and center, especially in cases that are nonroutine. Even as future judges (i.e., law students) learn 
the content of historical cases and rules, these same episodes yield instructive examples of proper judicial conduct 
and methods.” (footnote omitted)). 
56 Notably, the ethics guide that the Federal Judicial Center prepares for law clerks is framed in terms of 
“maintaining the public trust.” See Federal Judicial Center, Maintaining the Public Trust, Ethics for Federal Judicial 
Law Clerks 1 (4th ed. 2013), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2017/Maintaining-Public-Trust-4D-FJC-Public-
2013.pdf (“The parties and the public accept judges’ rulings because they trust the system to be fair and impartial. 
Maintaining this trust is crucial to the continued success of our courts.”). I thank Marin Levy for this reference. 
57 See, e.g., John Fabian Witt, The Secret History of the Chief Justice’s Obamacare Decision, in THE 
HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 215–216 (Nathaniel Persily, Gillian 
E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison eds., 2013) (arguing that Justice Brandeis instilled his broad view of Congress’s 
taxing authority in his law clerk Henry Friendly, who in turn instilled it in his law clerk John Roberts, so that “[t]he 
tax power strand in Roberts’s Obamacare opinion was made available by a professional culture of lawyers stretching 
back into the beginnings of the modern state”). Witt concludes that “[l]aw is located, in part, in the professional 
identities of the men and women who make it.” Id. at 222. 
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It is likely impossible to know—to determine empirically—how much of a long-term 
effect such ideas and the rhetoric associated with them have had or can have on judicial 
behavior. Court watchers who believe that the Justices are extraordinarily self-confident and 
assertive regardless of what others think may be inclined to doubt the efficacy of those methods. 
Much depends on the individual judge—for example, the extent to which he or she is attuned to 
potential threats to the Court’s institutional legitimacy and is prepared to take steps to preserve it. 
Yet it may be telling that constitutional law scholars (and the broader legal culture) keep 
generating such constraining conceptions; perhaps that would not keep happening if they made 
no difference at all. Those who have worked for judges or who interact with them in other ways 
are often left with the impression that most of them worry about staying within their limited 
institutional role even if they do not always seem to do so. And even such assertive, recent 
interventions as Shelby County v. Holder58 and Obergefell v. Hodges59 were actually culminating 
events; the judicial majorities that produced them proceeded incrementally and with apparent 
attention to the views of other actors.60  
More generally, it is easy to lose sight of the profoundly important questions that modern 
federal judges (whether named Garland or Gorsuch) will not decide assertively or at all, 
including matters of war and peace, the direction of federal fiscal or monetary policy, and the 
continued operation of various hard-wired provisions of the Constitution. Although Supreme 
Court Justices no doubt possess a great deal of power in modern America, they have not, on the 
whole, used their power to unwind all or most of the work of the political branches. That is not 
because anything in the Constitution or federal law somehow forcibly prevents them from doing 
so. Rather, it is because scholars, the public, and the Justices themselves have all internalized 
some relatively strong ideas about how federal judges ought to behave in the American 
constitutional system.  
None of that is to suggest, however, that concerns about efficacy are unreasonable. They 
are reasonable. Even so, it has seemed worthwhile to a great many constitutional law scholars to 
cultivate a culture of role constraints on judges. The balance of this Article will argue that it is 
similarly worthwhile to develop a role morality for presidents and members of Congress, even if 
concerns about efficacy are even more acute in the context of the political branches.61 The next 
Part suggests that the success of the American constitutional project depends in part upon elected 
officials who understand the normative limits of their institutional roles. 
                                                
58 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
59 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
60 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (precursor to Shelby County); 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (precursor to Obergefell); see also generally Neil S. Siegel, 
Federalism as a Way Station: Windsor as Exemplar of Doctrine in Motion, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS (2014) (analyzing 
the potential reasons for the Court’s unusual opinion in Windsor); Neil S. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation in the 
Federal Courts System, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (2017) (discussing the interaction between the Supreme Court and 
the lower federal courts beginning in Windsor and ending in Obergefell).  
61 This Article does not argue that the same role morality applies to judges and politicians. They occupy 
different institutional roles. For example, judges likely have greater obligations of reason giving and consistency 
than do elected officials, because judges have special obligations to maintain the rule of law and legislators (who 
have many more colleagues than judges) must often compromise to get anything done.  
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A predictable objection to the idea that role restraints beyond legal fidelity attach to 
political office, just as they apply to judicial office, is that the judicial analogy is misguided 
because such restraints apply only to countermajoritarian institutions and the political branches 
are majoritarian. That way of thinking is, of course, part of what Bickel, his teachers, and his 
contemporaries bequeathed to subsequent generations of constitutional law scholars. One 
response is that the federal electoral system has countermajoritarian components that are both 
numerous and severe,62  as does the federal policymaking process. 63  Those components can 
produce presidents and parties in control of Congress that lack majority or plurality support in 
the nation for their elections and priorities.  
Another response is that the objection is misguided even on its own terms because a 
constitutional role morality is important for members of institutions that attract majority support. 
Consider initially the case of judges. The Supreme Court tends to be a more majoritarian 
institution than Bickel ever imagined, and yet (or is it because?) a role morality is widely thought 
applicable to the conduct of the Justices, including when they possess majority support for their 
decisions. Moreover, the Justices are expected to respect role restraints when they decide cases 
not requiring constitutional judicial review, such as those involving statutory interpretation.  
Likewise, one should not conclude that a constitutional role morality is inapplicable to 
the conduct of elected officials when they possess majority support for the decisions. As 
explained in the next Part, realizing the ideal of democracy as collective self-governance does 
                                                
62 Countermajoritarian aspects include the malapportionment of the Senate, the Electoral College method of 
electing the president, gerrymandering aided by computer technology, the more efficient distribution of Republican 
voters around the nation, and a federal statute that requires single-member congressional districts. For discussions of 
political branch countermajoritarianism, see supra note 11 and accompanying text; Nate Cohn, Why Democrats 
Can’t Win the House, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/upshot/why-democrats-
cant-win.html (explaining why “clustering” of Democrats in urban areas impedes the ability of the Democratic Party 
to gain control of the House even when the party enjoys a national political majority); Emily Badger, As American 
as Apple Pie?: The Rural Vote’s Disproportionate Slice of Power, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/upshot/as-american-as-apple-pie-the-rural-votes-disproportionate-slice-of-
power.html (discussing the effects of rural favoritism in the constitutional structure on the outcomes of elections for 
president, House seats, and Senate seats); AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, at 413 
(noting that “[s]ince 1967, the single-member-district statute has been a fixed feature of the U.S. election code”). 
One should add low voter turnout, the fact that Americans who vote are whiter, older, and wealthier than the 
population as a whole, and the imposition of voting restrictions despite no credible evidence of a significant problem 
of in-person voter fraud. For discussions, see Lain, supra note 11, at 154, and LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE MYTH OF 
VOTER FRAUD (2010). 
63 Countermajoritarian aspects include the bicameralism and presentment requirements, the latter of which 
grants veto power to the president. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Congressional rules and practices, as well as 
political dynamics, also add to the countermajoritarian characteristics of the federal policymaking process. See 
LEVINSON, supra note 11, at 52–53 (discussing the Senate filibuster); THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, 
THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 45 (2006) 
(observing that “independent, unrepresentative, and constituency-controlled committees can distort legislative 
outcomes and frustrate chamber majorities and national interests”); Richard L. Hasen, Three Wrong Progressive 
Approaches (and One Right One) to Campaign Finance Reform, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 21, 33 (2014) (arguing 
that “large donors, lobbyists, and others who bundle contributions are able to obtain much broader access than others 
to legislators and staffers to make the case for legislative action (or inaction)” and that “[a]ccess does not guarantee 
legislative success, but it is usually a prerequisite”); Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From 
Courts to Congress to Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361 (2008) (concluding that 
“countermajoritarian policymaking is being enabled by almost every trend in American politics”). 
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not depend upon whether elected officials earn majority backing. In today’s America, for 
example, even when a president is elected by a popular majority, a large percentage of the 
population is likely to oppose his or her priorities. As also explored below, ensuring the basic 
functionality of the federal government does not turn on whether the institutions controlled by 
politicians are best described as majoritarian. For example, the appointments and legislative 
processes can grind to a halt or otherwise leave much to be desired when different politicians 
who control different veto gates were each elected by different popular majorities. 
As will be discussed, role restraints on both judges and elected officials may well loosen 
up when supermajorities of Americans support their proposed decisions.64 For example, given 
recent and dramatic changes in public sentiment regarding the permissibility of same-sex 
marriage, the Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges may have been more justifiable in 2015 
than it would have been in 2005 or 1995.65 Likewise, a president who enjoys 70 percent support 
may possess a special democratic warrant to act within the bounds set by the law (which includes 
respect for individual rights). But that is a far cry from the suggestion that 
countermajoritarianism exhausts the circumstances in which a role morality applies to elected 
officials. 
Perhaps the objection could be reframed by turning from the question of whether the 
institution under consideration is countermajoritarian to whether its members are elected. On that 
view, a constitutional role morality applies only if members of the institution are unelected, like 
federal judges, and not when they are elected, like presidents and members of Congress. It is not 
clear, however, why elections should make a decisive difference. It has just been noted that 
winning a federal election does not necessarily confer upon a president or member of Congress a 
majoritarian democratic warrant to act. Moreover, elected state judges are not generally thought 
to be unencumbered by a constitutional role morality, even if they may be less or differently 
encumbered.66 One may applaud or decry the greater political accountability of state judges 
relative to federal judges, but the way state judges typically act in court, the various procedures 
they are required to follow, and the ways they are expected to justify their decisions are more 
similar to federal judges than different. Most importantly, holding elections does not resolve the 
problems discussed below: securing both collective self-governance and a well-functioning 
federal government. At most, the greater level of accountability associated with elections (as 
                                                
64  See infra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing the case of elected officials who enjoy 
supermajority support over a sustained period of time to make significant legal and political change). 
65 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). This Article does not engage the complex questions of whether and when 
changes in public opinion potentially justify particular judicial interpretations of the Constitution. Public opinion 
may be relevant as part of the best living constitutionalist understanding of what a constitutional provision means, or 
because statesmanship previously counseled against the expression of the best understanding. For work in the 
former category, see generally Lain, supra note 11. For work in the latter category, see supra note 48, infra note 
160, and accompanying text. 
66 According to David Pozen, the fact that many state judges are popularly elected or retained potentially 
changes what role fidelity demands of them, so that it is inappropriate to apply to them normative models that 
presuppose the life tenure of federal judges. See David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 
110 COLUM. L. REv. 2047, 2083–86 (2010) (“The notion of majoritarian review . . . holds out the possibility that 
courts should flexibly interpret the law to reflect the contemporaneous beliefs of the people. The notion of role 
fidelity, furthermore, holds out the possibility that elected courts have special license to do this.”).  
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opposed to life tenure) suggests that elected officials should be less restrained by a constitutional 
role morality than are federal judges, not that politicians should not be restrained at all. 
 
II. SOURCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE MORALITY 
Why should elected officials owe anything to their political opponents, or to the nation as 
a whole, or to the institutions in which they serve? Framed more precisely, what are sources of a 
constitutional role morality for the elected officials of the national government? This Part locates 
those sources in two basic purposes of the Constitution whose accomplishment requires more 
than compliance with legal rules. 67  The first is vindicating the American commitment to 
democracy as collective self-governance. What is needed to achieve that purpose is illuminated 
by longstanding thinking in democratic theory—thinking that was reflected in the words and 
deeds of prominent American Founders and early Presidents—about the duty of representatives 
to represent the whole and not just the part. The second purpose is creating a reasonably well-
functioning federal government. Accomplishing that purpose in a robust separation of powers 
regime requires politicians to keep partisanship within reasonable bounds by practicing good 
institutional citizenship. 
Before proceeding, it is worth addressing an objection at the outset. The literature on 
political representation in normative and positive political theory is so robust and varied that one 
might question what constitutional law scholars could possibly add to academic discussions 
about the role responsibilities of elected officials.68 This Article provides one answer to that 
question by doing what the political theory literature characteristically does not do: draw upon a 
judicial analogy and tie arguments about the roles of the president and members of Congress in 
particular (as opposed to representatives more generally) to claims about the success of the 
American constitutional project in particular (as opposed to democracy or constitutional 
democracy more generally). What is required to sustain the U.S. Constitution in history is a 
subject to which academic constitutional lawyers can lay at least as much claim as political 
scientists. Adequately addressing the problem requires intimate familiarity with the American 
constitutional structure as specified in the text of the Constitution, as built out over time by 
elected officials, and as interpreted by the federal courts. Meeting the problem also requires an 
understanding of the functions that the Constitution exists to fulfill. Indeed, the participation of 
constitutional law scholars in scholarly discussions of the problem may be essential: it would be 
difficult to fully address the relationship between official roles and the constitutional project 
without a deep appreciation of the Constitution as law. 
 
                                                
67 There are, of course, other constitutional purposes, and law alone is likely insufficient to accomplish 
them. Rather than attempt to be comprehensive, this Article focuses on two such purposes that are under especially 
severe stress in current, polarized times.  
68 The most influential modern work is HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967). For an 
overview of the literature, see Suzanne Dovi, Political Representation, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 6, 2017), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/political-representation/. For useful essays, see POLITICAL 
REPRESENTATION (Ian Shapiro et al. eds., 2010). For further discussion of the literature, see infra notes 97–100. For 
additional citations to the literature, see Jackson, supra note 14, at 1749 n.87.   
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A. A Substantive Conception of Democracy 
Americans are committed to democracy as their ideal form of government, but what does 
that commitment entail? A persuasive substantive understanding of American democracy can be 
found in Frank Michelman’s emphasis on democracy as “self-rule,” the conviction that “the 
American people are politically free insomuch as they are governed by themselves 
collectively.” 69  Democracy as collective self-rule—collective self-governance—cannot 
persuasively be cashed out in terms of a simple voting procedure (like majority rule) that 
determines electoral winners and losers. On such a conception of democracy, there seems no 
good answer to the question of how electoral losers can be said to govern themselves when 
electoral winners impose their will on them. 
“A central problem of collective self-government that goes back at least to Rousseau,” 
Robert Post writes, “revolves around the question of how, in the face of manifest and 
indissoluble differences, we may be said to govern ourselves through collective self-
determination.” 70  “Why,” Post asks, “is every majoritarian enactment not also an act of 
oppression against a minority?”71 Rousseau was more helpful in framing the question than in 
formulating an attractive answer. His idea was that, after a process of majoritarian 
decisionmaking, the individual will of each citizen would be merged with the general will of all, 
so that, in obeying the general will, each citizen will “obey only himself and remain as free as 
before.”72 Rousseau did not adequately grapple with the stubborn fact of political disagreement 
when citizens are free to express their convictions and pursue their interests.73  
In more recent times, a wide range of democratic theorists has more plausibly posited that 
a feeling of self-governance can be instilled in citizens when electoral winners and losers alike 
are free to participate in the formation of public opinion to which electoral politics and 
subsequent policymaking are subservient. On that view, “the normative essence of democracy is 
. . . located in the communicative processes necessary to instill a sense of self-determination, and 
in the subordination of political decision-making to these processes.”74 Identifying collective 
                                                
69 Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1500–01 (1988).   
70 Robert C. Post, Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Judicial Review, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 429, 433 
(1998).     
71 Id.   
72  JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS 49–50 
(Victor Gourevitch ed., 1997) (1762).    
73 In writing those (in)famous words, Rousseau was referring to fundamental decisions of the “sovereign” 
people, which set the basic terms of the political community for all its members. He was not referring to acts of the 
“government” (including, in the United States today, the courts), whose more mundane role is to administer the 
fundamental law previously approved by a majority of the people. For a discussion of the distinction between 
“sovereignty” and “government” developed by Hobbes, Rousseau, and other political theorists, see generally David 
Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, The Original Theory of Originalism: A Review of Richard Tuck’s The Sleeping 
Sovereign, 127 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2018). This Article is concerned with decisions that Rousseau would 
categorize as acts of government, not sovereignty. Even (or, perhaps, especially) at the level of sovereignty, 
however, it is not clear how majority rule produces self-rule by citizens who are outvoted.  
74 POST, supra note 19, at 185. See id. at 184–86 (discussing the theorizing of Rousseau, Hans Kelsen, 
Benjamin Barber, John Dewey, Durkheim, Jürgen Habermas, and John Rawls). A potential ambiguity in the 
theorizing of dialogic theorists of democracy is whether there is a fact of the matter regarding whether citizens are 
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self-governance (and not a voting procedure like majority rule) as “the normative essence of 
democracy” helps explain why the modern Supreme Court describes the First Amendment “as 
the guardian of our democracy,” 75  even though the Court wields free-speech principles as 
authority for instructing some popular or legislative majority that it cannot govern just as it 
wishes. As Post writes, “[t]he Amendment serves to limit majoritarian enactments, so 
‘democracy’ cannot in this context be equated with simple majoritarianism.”76 “In fact,” Post 
continues, “majoritarianism, from the perspective of traditional First Amendment doctrine, is 
merely a mechanism for decision-making that we adopt to reflect the deeper value of self-
government . . . .”77 
It is unlikely, however, that First Amendment doctrine alone can fully accomplish the 
constitutional purpose of securing collective self-governance. As vital as the freedom to 
communicate on political matters is, it may go only so far in instilling in electoral losers a 
genuine sense of self-determination. Especially in a polarized community in which a great deal is 
perceived to turn on which political party wins each and every election, subordinating 
governmental decisionmaking to the communicative processes protected by the Amendment may 
not be enough to manage the tension between democracy and diversity. A potential democratic 
virtue of judicially enforceable individual rights—beyond protections for speech and voting—is 
that they take certain fundamental matters off the table for reconsideration at each election, 
thereby permitting electoral losers to retain a sense of self-governance at least to some extent.78 
But just as participation in the formation of public opinion may not suffice for electoral 
losers to experience themselves as self-governing, neither may rights protections. Citizens 
possess a variety of interests and commitments that they regard as profoundly important—
indeed, potentially more important than some of the rights they enjoy. And those interests are 
potentially fair game in the political process. What may also be required for a political regime of 
electoral winners and losers to more genuinely approximate the American ideal of collective 
self-governance is an internalized sense among elected officials that they owe something not 
only to citizens who voted for them, but also to those who voted against them and to the polity as 
a whole—that, in virtue of having won the previous election, they have assumed some 
responsibility to look after not just the interests and values of their supporters, but also of their 
political opponents and of the entire nation.  
                                                                                                                                                       
ruling themselves, or whether the self-governance about which dialogic theorists write is instead a matter of what 
citizens tell themselves. While the latter possibility may suffice for the sociological legitimacy of a political regime 
(that is, legitimacy conceived of as a psychological willingness to assent to state force), actual normative legitimacy 
(that is, legitimacy according to some higher vision of constitutional democracy as a picture of part of the good life) 
probably requires some minimum threshold of actual self-governance in order to avoid the damning objection that 
citizens are driven to storytelling so that they can live under the pleasing illusion of self-rule. 
75 Id. at 272 (“Every interpretation of the traditional First Amendment doctrine is, of course, contestable, 
but there is little dispute that one of the most important themes of that doctrine is the Amendment’s function ‘as the 
guardian of our democracy.’”) (citing, inter alia, Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982)).  
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 On the other hand, judicial protections will further undermine the self-governance of electoral losers 
when they believe that courts wrongly withdraw important matters from the realm of democratic debate and decide 
them incorrectly. 
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Such a constitutional role morality is supported by Edmund Burke’s general conception 
of the duty of a legislator, which he articulated in his famous Speech to the Electors of Bristol.79 
He delivered the speech at the conclusion of the 1774 election, in which he was chosen to serve 
as one of two representatives of Bristol in the House of Commons.80  The other successful 
candidate, Henry Cruger, had endorsed the right of constituents to instruct representatives on 
how to vote in Parliament.81 In response, Burke rejected such mandatory “instructions,” as they 
were called.82  
Given the issue that prompted the speech, Burke had no occasion to address the 
responsibility of legislators vis-à-vis those who did not vote for them. But his general statement 
regarding the role of a representative has implications for that issue. “Facing his constituents, 
both those who had voted for him and those who had not,”83 Burke emphasized the duty of 
members of Parliament to represent the whole and not just the part: 
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; 
which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents 
and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one 
interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought 
to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole. 
You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not member 
of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament. If the local constituent should have 
an interest, or should form an hasty opinion, evidently opposite to the real good of 
the rest of the community, the member for that place ought to be as far, as any 
other, from any endeavour to give it effect.84 
Burke imagined representatives as trustees, not as delegates.85 In his view, representatives were 
charged with following their own understanding of the best course of conduct to pursue for the 
polity as a whole, which on particular issues may differ from the wishes of the citizens who 
voted for them (and may at least partially reflect the understanding of those who did not). “It was 
necessary to be sensitive to local opinion, and equally to the sentiments of the nation at large,” 
the prominent Burke biographer Richard Bourke writes of Burke’s views.86 But “the highest role 
of a representative was to deliberate on the national interest, and for this they would have to 
                                                
79 EDMUND BURKE, SPEECH TO THE ELECTORS OF BRISTOL (NOV. 3, 1774), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, Ch. 13, Doc. 7 (1987), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch13s7.html.    
80 For discussions, see RICHARD BOURKE, EMPIRE & REVOLUTION: THE POLITICAL LIFE OF EDMUND BURKE 
373–90 (2015), and James Conniff, Burke, Bristol, and the Concept of Representation, 30 W. POL. Q. 329, 332–41 
(1977).     
81 BOURKE, supra note 80, at 381.     
82 Id.; Conniff, supra note 80, at 332–33.     
83 BOURKE, supra note 80, at 381.     
84 BURKE, supra note 79.    
85 Conniff, supra note 80, at 336.     
86 BOURKE, supra note 80, at 384.     
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subordinate particular interests to the common good, and interpret popular feeling in accordance 
with their own prudence.”87  
 In the same speech, Burke declared that “government and legislation are matters of 
reason and judgment, and not of inclination,” and he rhetorically asked “what sort of reason is 
that, in which the determination precedes the discussion; in which one set of men deliberate, and 
another decide; and where those who form the conclusion are perhaps three hundred miles 
distant from those who hear the arguments?”88  Another student of Burke’s thought, James 
Conniff, accordingly underscores that Burke viewed governance as not simply a matter of “will” 
but of “judgment” about “what is best to be done,” which requires deliberation among 
representatives, who are characteristically more informed about public affairs than their 
constituents.89  
At the same time, Burke believed that representatives must defend their votes and other 
conduct in office.90 He also believed that they must ultimately submit to the judgment of their 
constituents—as Burke himself did when he withdrew from the 1780 election upon realizing that 
he had alienated too many of his constituents to be returned to Parliament.91 (He had disagreed 
with them on, among other things, the government’s policy in America.92) But Burke’s eventual 
rejection by his constituents did not alter his conception of the theoretical relationship between 
representatives and voters that he had expressed six years earlier.93  
Americans living today need not accept a full-fledged (and frankly elitist) conception of 
elected representatives as trustees, let alone Burke’s views on virtual representation,94 to see the 
                                                
87 Id.     
88 BURKE, supra note 79.    
89 Conniff, supra note 80, at 333. See BURKE, supra note 79:    
It is [a representative’s] duty to sacrifice his repose, his pleasures, his satisfactions, to theirs; and 
above all, ever, and in all cases, to prefer their interest to his own. But his unbiassed opinion, his 
mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to 
any set of men living. These he does not derive from your pleasure; no, nor from the law and the 
constitution. They are a trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply answerable. 
Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of 
serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion. 
90 BOURKE, supra note 80, at 387.     
91 Id. at 386–89.     
92 Id. at 386; Conniff, supra note 80, at 332.    
93 BOURKE, supra note 80, at 389; Conniff, supra note 80, at 334. In conceding on September 9, 1780, 
Burke told his constituents, “I received your Trust in the face of day, in the face of day, I accept your dismission.” 
Edmund Burke, Speech on the Hustings at Bristol (Sept. 9, 1780), in III THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND 
BURKE 667 (Paul Langford et al. eds., 1970).        
94  Finding value in Burke’s conception of the role responsibilities of elected representatives does not 
commit one to the Crown’s claims for virtual representation of the American colonists, see JACK P. GREENE, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 67–72 (2010), let alone to American men’s claims for 
virtual representation of women, see Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, 
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 992–93 (2002). Arguments for virtual representation require 
justification for allowing only certain groups and not others to vote for representatives. How representatives execute 
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value in having presidents and members of Congress who have partially internalized a Burkean 
point of view. A Burkean perspective helps illuminate why it is deeply problematic for a 
representative to regard constituents who did not vote for her as outside her circle of concern. 
And, in circumstances like the contemporary United States, in which geography has taken on a 
partisan dimension, a Burkean vantage point also helps explain why it is troubling for a 
representative to vote to shift costs from her district or state onto others.95  
To be clear, this Article emphasizes themes that are most strongly associated with the 
trustee model of representation, as opposed to the delegate model,96 in the conviction that those 
themes are most absent (and needed) in contemporary American politics, most directly 
connected to the American ideal of democracy as collective self-governance, and most reflective 
of the values animating constitutional provisions that set fixed terms (of two-to-six years) for 
federal elected officials and do not permit instructions to, or recall of, those officials.97 The 
Article does not, however, mean to reject the insights offered by the other traditions.98 For 
example, the delegate model of representation, which characteristically instructs a representative 
to follow the wishes of her constituents, straightforwardly explains why it is wrong for the 
representative to betray her own supporters by sacrificing their concerns to those of her wealthy 
donors or herself. The distinctions among the traditions are easily overstated, and nuanced 
theorists who write in one tradition also emphasize themes from the others. 99  Americans 
reasonably make contradictory demands of representatives. Moreover, Hanna Pitkin famously 
emphasized the paradoxical nature of the concept of representation; urged theorists to stop trying 
to resolve the paradox; and suggested that representatives may think of themselves as both 
trustees and delegates.100  
                                                                                                                                                       
their responsibilities once in office is not the same question, even if it is also not an entirely unrelated question. For a 
discussion of the ways in which Burke’s own support for virtual representation was qualified (for example, he did 
not think it was possible in the case of America), see Conniff, supra note 80, at 338–39.       
95 To see the potential difference between taking seriously the interests of one’s constituents as a whole and 
taking seriously the interests of the nation as a whole, consider a recent example. A Republican from a low-tax “red” 
state whose constituents voted for him by a healthy margin over his opponent might be acting in the interests of not 
only the voters who voted for him, but also in the interests of the voters in his district who voted for the Democrat, 
by supporting the recent federal tax bill to the extent it shifts the burden of taxation from “red” states to “blue” states 
(by eliminating or greatly reducing the deductibility of state and local taxes). The Republican from the low-tax state 
is taking seriously the interests of his Democratic constituents, but he is not obviously considering the interests of 
both Republican and Democratic constituents in other states.     
96 The debate over “trustee” versus “delegate” models of representation is related to the debate over liberal 
versus republican theories of representation. For a cogent discussion of the latter debate, as well as of critical 
theories that reject both the liberal and republican traditions, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & 
ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 19–22 (2nd ed. 2006).     
97 Critics of the original Constitution pushed unsuccessfully for the addition of a right to instruct federal 
representatives. See HELEN E. VEIT ET AL., CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE 
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 151–77 (1991). 
98 See, e.g., infra notes 183–186 and accompanying text (emphasizing a concern of critical theorists).  
99 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 96, at 20–21.    
100 See PITKIN, supra note 68, at 154–55, 165–67.    
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Granting all that, one can still be forgiven for asking skeptical questions about what it can 
mean for an often-divided people to still constitute “one nation, with one interest, that of the 
whole.”101 But just as a crude legal realism can be self-fulfilling when legal actors reason from a 
realist point of view, the spirit of Burke’s perspective can be conducive to the development of a 
constitutional role morality that prompts elected officials to see beyond their own political base. 
Of course, the caution that “realism yields realism” risks provoking the response that “blind faith 
yields suckers.” Such a response is especially tempting at moments of exasperation after learning 
about the latest political outrage committed by the “other side.” The challenge may be to avoid 
cynicism on the one hand and naiveté on the other—to develop a more inspiring account of 
American politics that realism can nonetheless potentially accept as true at some future time.102 
On the American side of the Atlantic, James Madison articulated a Burkean perspective, 
at least in part, in his public advocacy in support of the Constitution’s ratification.103 Madison 
decried both majority and minority faction in Federalist 10, and he emphasized the importance 
of “refin[ing] and enlarge[ing] the public views, by passing them through the medium of a 
chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and 
whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial 
considerations.”104 “Under such a regulation,” he continued, “it may well happen that the public 
voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public 
good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose.” Madison’s 
representatives, like Burke’s, would ideally pursue the “public good” instead of the narrow 
interests of their constituents105—or themselves.106 “As there is a degree of depravity in mankind 
which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust,” Madison wrote in Federalist 55, 
“so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and 
confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher 
degree than any other form.”107 
                                                
101 Burke, supra note 79.  
102 Cf. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 127 (1921) (“We must seek a 
conception of law which realism can accept as true.”).   
103  For discussion of the similarities and differences between Burke’s and Madison’s views on 
representation, see PITKIN, supra note 68, at 190–92.     
104 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).        
105 Id. Madison thought that larger election districts would help produce better representatives than would 
smaller election districts. Id. at 82–83. 
106  Drawing from (among many other things) Madison’s views about the obligations of elected 
representatives, Theodore Rave argues that political representatives, like corporate agents, should be treated as 
fiduciaries and so subject to a duty of loyalty, which they breach when they manipulate election laws to their own 
advantage. See D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 710–11 (2013). Rave’s 
project is distinct from this one in that he focuses on judicial enforcement of legal obligations that representative 
agents owe to their diffuse principals. Nonetheless, conceiving of representatives as fiduciary agents is in the spirit 
of this Article, which asks into the political obligations that elected officials should have to a set of principals that 
includes not only their own supporters, but also the political opposition, the nation as a whole, and the governmental 
institutions in which they serve. 
107 THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, at 346 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).        
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To be sure, Madison is typically viewed as having been a proponent of the delegate 
model of representation,108 Because he believed that “[e]nlightened statesmen will not always be 
at the helm,” his “principa[l]” solution to the problem of majority faction was structural, not 
Burkean.109 He endorsed extending the sphere of republican government to encompass greater 
social heterogeneity, thereby making majority factions less likely to form and, if they do form, 
less likely to act in concert effectively.110 Madison was thus suggesting that the contents and 
interactions of citizen preferences in the national legislature of the extended republic would help 
ameliorate the problems associated with poor representatives. It is important to note, however, 
that Madison emphasized both extending the sphere and securing high-quality representatives. 
“In the 1780s,” Gordon Wood writes, “James Madison had his doubts about this moral capacity 
of the people stretched to the limit, but even he admitted that ordinary people had to have 
sufficient ‘virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom’ or ‘no theoretical checks, 
no form of government, can render us secure.’”111  
Notably, Madison’s objective in extending the sphere was to force greater consensus in 
political decision-making. “In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great 
variety of interests, parties and sects which it embraces,” Madison wrote at the end of Federalist 
51, “a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other 
principles than those of justice and the general good.”112 Madison’s two approaches are thus 
potentially related in that public-spirited representatives may be necessary to prevent the 
extended sphere from causing negotiation and coalition-building in Congress to fail routinely.113 
That risk, whose associated costs have increased substantially over time as Americans have come 
to expect more of the federal government than they did in Madison’s day, is discussed in the next 
sub-Part. 
                                                
108 Madison defined representative government as involving “the delegation of the government . . . to a 
small number of citizens elected by the rest.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). See Dovi, supra note 68 (contrasting Madison’s views on representation with Burke’s). 
109 See Larry Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 658 n.206 (1999) (noting the debate 
among historians regarding whether Madison placed greater emphasis on improving the quality of representatives or 
extending the sphere, and opining that “[i]t is a strange debate, inasmuch as Madison’s own words leave little room 
for doubt that he viewed the effect of size in diluting faction as more important”).  
110 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“Extend the sphere, and 
you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have 
a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult 
for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.”). 
111 GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 9 (2009); 
see RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 300 (1990) (“Madison insisted repeatedly that the future of 
republican government was hopeless without some confidence in human virtue . . . .”).        
112 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 325 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
113 Madison posited that the diversity present in the extended republic would be reflected and managed in 
Congress. See, e.g., Samuel Kernell, “The True Principles of Republican Government”: Reassessing James 
Madison’s Political Science, in JAMES MADISON: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 92, 92 
(Samuel Kernell ed., 2003) (“In Number 10 his solution takes the form of an extended republic containing 
numerous, diverse factions whose representatives reconcile their competing interests in a well designed, deliberative 
national legislature.”). 
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The presidency of George Washington was practically obsessed with ideas about proper 
behavior by government officials. Washington was mindful that Article II did not define “[t]he 
executive Power”114  with anything approaching the precision with which Articles I and III 
defined the federal legislative and judicial powers, respectively. He was also aware that the ways 
in which he chose to execute his responsibilities would likely set precedents for future 
presidents.115 Washington made fateful decisions with respect to recognizing and derecognizing 
foreign governments, communicating (including in secret) with foreign governments and 
negotiating treaties without the Senate’s prior knowledge, seeking Senatorial consent but not 
advice in the treaty-making process, making the ultimate decision (after Senate consent) to ratify 
treaties himself in the name of the nation, and insisting that cabinet members served at his 
pleasure and so could be removed without cause and without Senate consent. 116  Although 
Washington mostly (and appropriately) defended the authority of the presidency in those 
episodes, he also insisted upon obtaining congressional authorization before engaging in any 
non-defensive use of the military (most notably against Indian tribes).117  
Most significant for present purposes is an observation by Akhil Amar: “Washington, by 
temperament and philosophy, was a consensus-seeker.”118 Just as “[w]ar councils had served him 
well when he was a battlefield general,” so “in his vision of public service, patriotic officials of 
all stripes should ideally converge on nonpartisan solutions when presented with the same 
facts.”119 As a result, Washington “sought advice from his departmental heads even on topics 
beyond the strict boundaries of their respective departmental assignments, and later presidents 
followed suit.”120  Relatedly, Washington put rivals (such as Hamilton and Jefferson) in his 
cabinet. And during his first term, he started a presidential tradition of visiting the states in order 
to interact with Americans, including long trips up through New England and then down through 
the South—all thirteen states—in an effort to foster national unity, which he understood the 
nation would require if it were going to endure.121 
                                                
114 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.   
115 Members of the first Congress were also aware of the potential precedent-setting implications of their 
proceedings. Madison, for example, told his colleagues in the first Congress that their own decision regarding the 
power of the president to remove executive branch officials unilaterally “will become the permanent exposition of 
the Constitution.” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 514 (1789). For a discussion, see Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After 
Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. Rev. 1, 28–
29 (2015). For a recent, popular history of the first Congress, see generally FERGUS M. BORDEWICH, THE FIRST 
CONGRESS: HOW JAMES MADISON, GEORGE WASHINGTON, AND A GROUP OF EXTRAORDINARY MEN INVENTED THE 
GOVERNMENT (2016). 
116 For a discussion, see AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, at 307–32.        
117 See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 637 
(6th ed. 2017) (discussing President’s Washington’s views on the permissibility of non-defensive uses of military 
force by the president).   
118 AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, at 326. 
119 Id.   
120 Id.   
121 See generally T.H. BREEN, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S JOURNEY: THE PRESIDENT FORGES A NEW NATION 
(2016).   
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In addition, Washington’s patriotic insistence on renouncing power—first after successful 
military command, and then after serving for eight years as president—reflected his conviction 
that continued power was improper and dangerous, even if not unlawful, and so not in the best 
interests of the nation. Washington played the initial, pivotal role in establishing the 
constitutional convention against presidents serving more than two terms, which was legally 
permissible prior to the adoption of the Twenty-Second Amendment in 1951.122 Washington 
stepped down, and it was generally thought thereafter that it would be improper to deviate from 
his example. Ratification of the 22nd Amendment, which legally limited presidents to two terms, 
likely signified that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) had contravened the convention 
(or, perhaps, had availed himself of an emergency exception to it),123 not that the convention had 
never existed.124 
Even as much of a majoritarian and a partisan as Thomas Jefferson was moved to voice 
an inclusive conception of American governance in his First Inaugural Address. (Presidents often 
speak that way after a bruising election campaign, and it may be unduly cynical to dismiss their 
addresses simply as cheap talk, as opposed to efforts to appeal to their and our better selves.) 
Jefferson spoke after a deeply divisive contest between the incumbent Federalist Party and 
Jefferson’s own Democratic Republican Party that was ultimately settled in the House of 
Representatives. “[T]hough the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail,” he said, “that will, 
to be rightful, must be reasonable; . . . the minority possess their equal rights, which equal laws 
must protect, and to violate would be oppression.”125 Continuing, he famously declared that 
“[w]e are all republicans: we are all federalists.”126 To Jefferson, such sentiments were part of 
“the creed of our political faith; the text of civic instruction, the touchstone by which to try the 
services of those we trust.”127 He added that “should we wander from them in moments of error 
or of alarm, let us hasten to retrace our steps, and to regain the road which alone leads to peace, 
liberty and safety.”128 
For Burke, Madison, Washington, Jefferson, and a host of eminent academic theorists, 
democratic politics is not persuasively viewed as simply licensing the public indulgence of one’s 
ideological appetites or the exercise of one’s will. Democracy is also a principled realm, one that 
both enables and constrains. In such a realm, having the legal power to accomplish an objective 
does not make it appropriate to do so. As Eric Posner recently put the point simply but 
                                                
122 For a discussion of constitutional conventions, see infra notes 167–173 and accompanying text.   
123  See Joseph Jaconelli, The Nature of Constitutional Convention, 19 LEGAL STUD. 24, 33 (1999) 
(suggesting that the constitutional convention could be read as subject to an exception in circumstances of 
emergency, so that FDR could be understood as having acted within the terms of the convention). 
124 For a discussion, see Bradley & Siegel, supra note 46, at 267–68.   
125 Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Apr. 30, 1801), in 33 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 
148–52 (2006), https://jeffersonpapers.princeton.edu/selected-documents/first-inaugural-address-0.   
126 Id.   
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powerfully, “[t]he president’s authority rests on trust and discretion, not on triumph of the 
will.”129  
Governance that is narrowly partisan can strain the relationships of trust that are 
necessary to make collective self-governance realizable to an appreciable extent in the United 
States. A constitutional role morality that tasks elected officials with trying in good faith to 
achieve some level of inclusivity and bipartisan support reinforces those relationships of trust. 
Elected officials may often fail to achieve such support, and sometimes they should fail: just as 
bare democratic majorities can be right or wrong about profoundly important matters, so can 
supermajorities. But it may be worth keeping in mind that Madison was not thinking as a 
partisan when he supported adding rights provisions to the original Constitution so as to “render 
it as acceptable to the whole people of the United States, as it has been found acceptable to a 
majority of them.”130 Likewise, Lincoln did not have narrow partisan majorities in mind when he 
poignantly resolved that the American nation “shall have a new birth of freedom” and that 
“government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”131 That 
much is evident from his own efforts at national reconciliation—without compromising over 
slavery—before he was assassinated.132  
 
B. A Well-Functioning Federal Government 
In addition to the American conception of democracy as collective self-governance, 
which other political communities may share, another foundation upon which to rest a 
constitutional role morality for elected officials is more distinctly American. The United States 
Constitution brought into being a robust system of separation of powers and checks and 
balances. The Framers fashioned such a horizontal constitutional structure without anticipating 
political parties, let alone the ideological parties in existence today but absent throughout most of 
the twentieth century. That regime of separation of powers, which is often characterized by the 
                                                
 129  Eric Posner, Judges v. Trump: Be Careful What You Wish For, N.Y TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/opinion/judges-v-trump-be-careful-what-you-wish-for.html?_r=1. 
130 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 448–49 (1789). 
131  Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address, ABRAHAM LINCOLN ONLINE (Nov. 19, 1863), 
http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm.  
132 Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s firm rejection of President Trump’s idea of eliminating the 
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nominees/article/2010022 (noting the various actions that Leader McConnell has taken to prevent Senate Democrats 
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separation of parties in control of different parts of the government, 133  creates ample 
opportunities for one political party, or a part of one party, to thwart potential action by the 
federal government. Moreover, because the minority party in the Senate is empowered to 
filibuster most legislation, the problem of potential paralysis endures in circumstances of unified 
government. As a result, troubling questions arise regarding how the federal government is to 
execute its basic responsibilities of filling executive and judicial offices, solving problems that 
the states are not well-situated to address on their own (characteristically, multi-state collective 
action problems),134 and safeguarding rights through the passage and updating of civil rights 
legislation (which several constitutional provisions authorize Congress to do).135 The separation 
and interrelation of powers are supposed to cabin and qualify the exercise of the substantial set of 
powers that the Constitution vests in the federal government. The separation is not supposed to 
largely negate or neuter those powers. 
Commentators who reject that understanding of the limited role of the separation of 
powers in the constitutional scheme will likely reject the analysis that follows in this sub-Part. 
Unfortunately, an attempt to fully defend the structural vision emphasized here would take this 
Article too far afield. For present purposes, two points will have to suffice. First, the Framers of 
1787 gathered in Philadelphia to substantially enhance federal power, not to restrict it.136 Given 
the heated rhetoric about a federal leviathan that one often encounters, it bears emphasizing that 
the perceived problem in the 1780s was that the national government under the Articles of 
Confederation was way too weak, not that it was so strong that a complex institutional 
architecture was needed to restrain it. 137  Second, and fast-forwarding to the present, most 
Americans living today look to the federal government to actually exercise its powers in a 
variety of ways, not to be consistently hamstrung in its ability to do so. There comes a point at 
which the “checks and balances” theory of the horizontal constitutional structure malfunctions; 
rather than acting to discourage ill-considered or excessive federal action, all the veto gates 
produce hopeless gridlock and obstructionism.   
One obvious response is to invoke the vertical constitutional structure—that is, 
federalism. On that view, it is a good thing (or at least not a bad thing) if the federal government 
                                                
133 See generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 2311 (2006).   
134 For work developing and applying the theory of collective action federalism, see generally Robert D. 
Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
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is incapable of taking effective action; the states can often act effectively, and federal inaction 
leaves the states more room to maneuver. To understand why that position is ultimately 
unpersuasive, it is important to recall the basic insight of collective action federalism.138 There 
are many problems in today’s modern, integrated economy and society whose nature and scope 
disrespect state borders, so that the states actually need the federal government to be able to step 
in. Examples include military defense, anti-terrorism efforts, interstate markets, interstate 
infrastructure, and environmental protection. Where collective action by states is required in 
order for substantial progress to be made, having a strong, effective federal government 
promotes rather than undermines state autonomy. Accordingly, if one examines the entire 
American constitutional structure—not just the horizontal separation and interrelation of powers 
at the federal level, but also the vertical separation of powers between the federal government 
and the states—the most compelling conclusion is that all Americans, as well as state 
governments themselves, are better served as a general matter by a federal government that can 
act, and act effectively.139   
There is another reason why the separation of powers and parties may at first glance seem 
like only a feature and never a bug. If (as the previous sub-Part argued) governmental action that 
is narrowly partisan can be a problem from the standpoint of collective self-governance, then 
part of the solution is to impose consensus-forcing devices, and veto gates can serve that 
function. No doubt, there is truth in that reasoning: a close relationship exists between, say, the 
filibuster as to appointments or legislation and the facilitation of collective self-rule. The 
difficulty is that facilitating collective self-governance is not the only responsibility of the federal 
government. As noted, the political branches are also charged with accomplishing various tasks 
associated with governance, from appointing officials to enacting legislation. And veto gates can 
result in Congress accomplishing little, which has arguably been the case at the federal level too 
often in recent years. For example, whatever one’s preferred solution to the problem of more 
than eleven million undocumented people living to a significant extent in the shadows in the 
United States, the federal government should also be addressing the issue through new 
legislation, not just through unilateral action by the president (whether Obama or Trump).140  
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To be sure, a number of heated political disagreements in America today are in part 
precisely about how much action the federal government should be taking. As noted, however, it 
also seems true that Americans of most ideological stripes want the federal government to be 
able to act effectively, even if they sometimes disagree about the spheres or directions in which 
such effective action should take place.141 (Demands for a robust federal response to the latest 
natural disaster continuously bring that point home.) And the federal government cannot function 
effectively if presidents or parties in control of Congress push to the legal limits their powers to, 
for example, veto legislation, nominate aggressive partisans, decline to nominate people to fill 
key positions, repeatedly filibuster executive or judicial branch nominees or legislation, and deny 
confirmation hearings or votes (or not consider nominees at all).  
Consider again, for example, the Senate’s handling of judicial nominations in recent 
years.142 Because the Supreme Court is not like other courts, it is a serious problem if we have in 
fact reached the point at which Supreme Court vacancies will go unfilled unless the same 
political party controls the White House and the Senate. The Supreme Court plays a unique role 
in ensuring uniformity on important questions of federal law, and an even number of Justices on 
a closely divided Court impairs its ability to execute that responsibility. The Court ends up 
granting fewer cases, splitting 4-4 on some of the cases it does agree to hear (thereby not 
establishing a precedent), and deciding some cases very narrowly (thereby offering little 
guidance) in order to avoid such splits.143 Moreover, judges from other courts cannot sit by 
designation in order to break ties, nor could visiting judges provide the kind of guidance and 
stability that the legal system often requires.  
That example illustrates the potential tension between the pursuit of collective self-
governance and the pursuit of effective self-governance—of collective action. The question the 
example raises is whether there are, or can be developed, normative constraints on elected 
officials over and above strictly legal limits that can encourage officials to participate in the 
political process with some self-restraint, and so refrain from pushing their powers to their 
respective maxima. As the English Whig and Liberal politician (and future prime minister) Lord 
John Russell wrote to Poulett Thomson in 1839 while the latter was Governor General of 
Canada, “[e]very political constitution in which different bodies share the supreme power is only 
enabled to exist by the forbearance of those among whom this power is distributed. . . . Each 
must exercise a wise moderation.”144 Representatives disserve everyone, including Americans 
who did vote for them, when they undermine the proper functioning of the constitutional system. 
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Relevant in this regard is the political science literature suggesting that today’s elected officials 
are disserving their constituents (including the people who voted for them) by pursuing policies 
that are more extreme than what their constituents would want.145 
Thomas Jefferson, as Secretary of State, insisted that there were normative constraints on 
the political discretion of elected officials. President Washington asked him for a formal legal 
opinion on the question of whether the Senate had the right to negative the grade of persons 
appointed by the president to fill foreign missions. As my colleague H. Jefferson Powell 
explains, “Eighteenth century international law and etiquette recognized an elaborate hierarchy 
of diplomats.” 146  The “grade” was the place in the hierarchy that “a country accorded its 
representative(s) to another state,” and it “was itself a substantive act in the conduct of foreign 
relations.”147 After analyzing the question presented and concluding that the Senate lacked such 
power, Jefferson considered the counterargument “that the Senate may, by continual negatives 
on the person, do what amounts to a negative on the grade; and so indirectly defeat this right of 
the President.”148 Jefferson’s answer was that “this would be a breach of trust, an abuse of the 
power confided to the Senate, of which that body cannot be supposed capable.”149  “If the 
Constitution had meant to give the Senate a negative on the grade or destination, as well as the 
person,” Jefferson reasoned, “it would have said so in direct terms, and not left it to be effected 
by a sidewind.”150 He concluded: “It could never mean to give them the use of one power thro 
the abuse of another.”151 Particularly in current, polarized times, it is not difficult to dismiss as 
hopelessly naïve Jefferson’s invocation “a breach of trust, an abuse of power confided to the 
Senate.” But it may be especially important in such times to resist reaching for the cynical acid. 
A constitutional role morality for elected officials can be based in part upon the 
normative desirability of keeping partisanship within reasonable bounds so that the federal 
government can function more effectively and with greater stability—so that there is more 
bipartisan action by the federal government, as opposed to opposition-forced inaction or 
narrowly partisan action (often accompanied by a disreputable policymaking process) in order to 
overcome the opposition. A role morality for elected officials, while not in the Constitution, is 
deeply connected to the Constitution because law alone is not enough to sustain the American 
constitutional project. Disregarding the role expectations that pertain to elective office is not 
simply bad politics or policy, but constitutes a deviation from norms of good institutional 
citizenship that help the constitutional system endure. Such a suggestion may seem naïve, just as 
Jefferson’s assessment of the question posed to him by President Washington may seem naïve. 
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But it is also possible that many contemporary elected officials have lost their way and should be 
encouraged to find their way back. The same should be said of the donors, party officials, 
advocacy groups, media outlets, and constituents who constitute the environment in which 
elected officials must function. 
 
III. THE CONTENTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE MORALITY 
What should a role morality for elected officials of the federal government look like? 
How does it differ from governmental paralysis? This Part fleshes out those questions and offers 
preliminary answers. The first sub-Part defines the problem and explains why it would be 
advisable to temper expectations regarding the articulation of solutions. The second sub-Part 
offers potential candidates for inclusion in a constitutional role morality.  
In order to make some progress on what is a profoundly difficult set of issues, this Part—
like the Article more generally—will engage in abstraction by discussing federal elected officials 
as a general class of actors, at least for the most part. In reality, however, presidents may be 
differently situated from members of Congress in certain respects; for example, presidents are 
the leaders of their political party. Similar observations could be made of judges; for example, 
the role expectations of Supreme Court Justices may differ in significant ways from those of 
lower federal court judges.152 Yet it is still commonplace and useful for certain purposes to talk 
of judicial role morality in general. Because the question of whether a role morality applies to 
presidents and members of Congress at all is so under-explored among constitutional law 
scholars in the United States, it seems appropriate to lump federal elected officials together at 
this preliminary stage. There will be time enough to split them apart.153  
 
A. The Problem 
Grounding role expectations for federal elected officials in (1) the normative ideal of 
democracy as collective self-governance and (2) a well-functioning federal government implies 
that electoral winners owe something both to their political opponents, to the nation as a whole, 
and to the institutions in which they serve. But what do they owe? It cannot be correct in 
principle that moderation and compromise are always the proper course of action. And if 
supermajority support were required before elected officials could act, too little worth doing by 
the federal government would be accomplished in a polarized society. To put the point 
hyperbolically (as it has been put to me), winning an election cannot mean that you never really 
win, and losing cannot mean that you never really lose. Elections do have significant 
consequences, and the winners are entitled to act like it. 
                                                
152 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 60, at 1222–24 (discussing similarities and differences between the behavior 
and job responsibilities of Supreme Court Justices and lower federal court judges).  
153 Because this Article grounds constitutional role morality in specific purposes of the U.S. Constitution, it 
seems appropriate to focus on federal elected officials, and not elected officials more generally. 
	 32	
 And so, the problem of what elected officials owe their opponents, nation, and 
institutions defies easy solutions. Before sketching some potential answers, three observations 
seem warranted. First, the question of what role morality demands of judges is also quite 
challenging. Yet because of what has been perceived to be at stake, the difficulty of the task has 
not dissuaded generations of constitutional law scholars, and even judges themselves, from 
attending to the problem. The same posture seems appropriate in the case of elected officials. 
 Second, this Article has relatively modest expectations. It will have succeeded to the 
extent that readers are far enough along in considering its argument to be moved to ask what role 
expectations for politicians should look like. The dominant discourse in American constitutional 
law and politics, including in most of the law review literature, assumes or asserts that there are 
no principled restraints on elected officials other than legality. 
 Third, it is important to have modest expectations in considering potential answers to the 
question of what role restraints should look like. Again, it is a terribly difficult question, and it 
has yet to be much analyzed by academic constitutional lawyers in the United States. As in the 
cases of theories of morality, political theories of representation, professional ethics in applicable 
fields, and role morality in the judicial realm, answers are likely to be contestable and 
contested,154 and to illuminate the question not just by revealing truth but also by exemplifying 
error. The most that can probably be hoped for, at least at this point, is to offer perspectives and 
starting points for critical assessment and further inquiry. 
 
B. A Sketch of a Role Morality for Federal Elected Officials 
 A vision of the constitutional role morality that attaches to federal elective office can be 
developed along at least three dimensions: the rhetorical, the procedural, and the substantive. 
Each is discussed below, in increasing order of difficulty. The distinction between procedure and 
substance, although a generally useful one, can be as challenging to draw on the edges in this 
context as in others. There is room for disagreement about the placement of certain 
considerations articulated below in one category or another.155 
 One of the first obligations that a constitutional role morality would likely impose on 
federal elected officials—the president above all others, but members of Congress as well—is to 
seek ways of reaching out rhetorically to Americans who voted against them. (In that regard, 
Jefferson’s First Inaugural Address, discussed above, is a model.156) Moreover, a role morality 
would counsel officials to continue reaching out rhetorically throughout their time in 
office. Under no circumstances would a role morality advise elected officials to gratuitously 
alienate non-supporters by, for example, calling them names or mocking their identities or way 
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of life. Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton likely fell short in this regard when she said at a 
fundraiser that “you could put half of Trump’s supporters into what I call the basket of 
deplorables.”157    
 A qualification is immediately in order. The feeling and expression of political sympathy 
and inclusion, even as a theoretical matter, may be (and certainly is in fact) conditional rather 
than unconditional. Accordingly, the rhetorical reaching out suggested above would need to 
know some bounds. It should likely be limited to Americans whose commitments and conduct 
fall within a broad, but not limitless, range of reasonable disagreement.158 Although the bounds 
of reasonableness will be contestable and contested (especially given the degrees of polarization 
and ill will that characterize contemporary American politics), there are at least some consensus 
candidates for exclusion from the universe of rhetorical concern. White supremacists, neo-Nazis, 
and terrorists come immediately to mind. 
Even qualifying the claim in the way described above, an obvious response is that such 
sympathetic talk amounts to mere gestures, mere matters of appearance. It is primarily about 
appearances, but that observation counts against the proposal only on a cynical premise of 
disingenuousness that is rejected by the whole project of developing a constitutional role 
morality. As Justice O’Connor wrote in a different context (namely, the intersection of race and 
electoral design), “appearances do matter.” 159  Americans will put up with a good deal of 
disappointment if they feel that they matter—that they are being respected and heard by elected 
officials even if the answer is “no.”160 A role morality for elected officials in the United States 
should likely reflect the idea that those who govern have a duty to make all of us feel that we are 
within the political community for whose welfare they are concerned. 
 It is easy to underestimate the significance of rhetoric. The reason politicians use rhetoric 
is that it can shape people’s perceptions and commitments. A strengthened rhetoric of inclusion 
and equal concern is likely to shape reality in positive directions. Consider, in that regard, the 
social value of driving overt racism (almost) out of the public sphere—and of resisting its 
reintroduction. The shift in recent decades away from anti-LGBTQ rhetoric in the public sphere 
is another example of the power of rhetoric to change social attitudes.161 
 Procedurally, several promising possibilities are worth considering for inclusion in the 
role expectations of elected officials. Informing those possibilities is the insight of dialogic 
theorists of democracy, discussed above, that a procedural approach is the most feasible way to 
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reconcile democracy and diversity.162 A procedural approach may also be a promising way to 
reconcile the entitlement of electoral winners to act on their promises to supporters with the other 
potential responsibilities discussed immediately below. 
First, moving beyond rhetorical outreach, elected officials should have a responsibility to 
take seriously the concerns of non-supporters, the best interests of the nation, and the long-term 
health of their institutions by considering each of them in good faith. There ought to be some 
obligation to balance one’s partisan and electoral interests against the interests of political 
opponents, the nation as a whole, and the institution in which one serves. Of course, this does not 
mean that politicians should not pursue their partisan and electoral interests. For example, a 
president ought to have due regard for the future of the political party that he or she leads; the 
party constitutes the primary institutional means of continuing his or her policies after leaving 
office. The modest suggestion here is only that politicians should not exclusively consider 
partisan and electoral interests. 
Second, electoral winners should, at least as a general matter, have a duty to consult with 
opposition leaders before making important decisions or taking significant actions. In addition to 
building trust and facilitating cooperation, consultation is an important way to ensure that one’s 
beliefs about political issues are epistemically responsible, meaning that they are formed and 
maintained without being distorted by ideology, wishful thinking, framing effects, confirmation 
bias, etc.163 A failure to consult is part of what we have seen in the political branches in recent 
years in the area of judicial nominations.164 As a result, both collective self-governance and the 
effective functioning of the federal government have arguably suffered.  
Third, electoral winners should have an obligation to deliberate in good faith with 
opposition leaders when considering whether to take important actions. This does not mean that 
electoral winners should not ultimately act on their agendas. It does mean, however, that they 
should ordinarily not act before first attempting to enlist the support of, and then negotiate with, 
the other side. That is a more demanding obligation than the aforementioned proposals to 
consider and consult.   
Another qualification is warranted. The above proposals to “reach out,” “take seriously,” 
“consult,” “deliberate,” and keep doing so throughout one’s term in office raise obvious concerns 
about opportunity cost and futility. Life is short, time in elective office is even shorter, and 
unless the reaching out is relatively casual, elected officials may not have enough time and 
energy to keep at it, especially with respect to the ideological fringes of each party in 
Congress. How much reaching out, to whom, and for how long are not questions that can be 
answered theoretically; they require exercise of the human faculty of judgment in particular 
situations as they arise. The most that can be said theoretically is that elected officials will need 
to trade off the rhetorical and procedural values described above with the vindication of other 
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important values, including those associated with the successful passage of legislation and 
effective governance more generally. 
Substantively, the contents of a constitutional role morality should likely include general 
compliance with established political norms that advance constitutional purposes.165 To be sure, 
norms are “inherently provisional; they simultaneously settle presidential duty for a time and 
orient contestation over what acceptable behavior should be.”166 The same could be said of 
congressional norms. But surely certain norms are so well-established and serve such vital 
constitutional functions that a politician would require special justification to flout them. For 
example, routine lying by elected officials alienates the political opposition and makes political 
cooperation very difficult. Moreover, the obligation of elected officials to avoid some norm 
violations likely trumps the desire or duty to stay in office. The fact that norms are in the way 
does not furnish justification for violating them. They are supposed to be in the way. 
The contents of a role morality should also likely include general compliance with 
“constitutional conventions” in the British (and, more generally, Commonwealth) sense of that 
term. As Keith Whittington has explained, constitutional conventions may be understood “as 
maxims, beliefs, and principles that guide officials in how they exercise political discretion.”167 
Derived in substantial part from the historical practices of governmental institutions, they are 
non-legal in status but are experienced as obligatory.168 Unlike political conventions generally, 
moreover, constitutional conventions advance a purpose of the constitution. In the United States, 
such purposes include facilitating democratic self-government (as discussed above),169 creating 
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(Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009); David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 
124 YALE L.J. 2, 29–39, 69 (2014); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 523 
& n.2, 544 (2004); and Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1181–
94 (2013). 
168  British commentator Albert Venn Dicey, writing during the late nineteenth century, viewed 
constitutional conventions as obligatory—as specifying how discretionary governmental power “ought to be 
exercised.” A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 346 (London, 
MacMillan & Co. 3d ed. 1889). 
169  The Constitution is not generally thought by experts to entitle registered voters to cast votes for 
Presidential electors. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature 
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . . . .”). Even so, a constitutional convention renders it unthinkable, except 
possibly in extraordinary circumstances, for a state legislature to appoint a slate of electors instead of allowing its 
registered voters to participate. Likewise, even though the Constitution is not generally thought by experts to 
prohibit members of the Electoral College from ignoring the popular vote for President in the states that appoint 
them, the overwhelming majority of electors throughout American history have not felt free to ignore the popular 
vote and cast their ballots for the candidate they personally prefer. See HERBERT W. HORWELL, THE USAGES OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 5, 7 (1925) (observing that the United States, like Great Britain, has various “customs, 
practices, maxims and precepts which are not enforced by the courts, and which thus correspond to the English 
[constitutional conventions],” and pointing as an example to “the understanding that Presidential Electors shall not 
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an effective federal government (also discussed above), protecting judicial independence,170 and 
preventing the corruption of federal criminal law enforcement. 171  To act contrary to a 
constitutional convention, as Whittington observes, “is to violate the spirit of the constitution, 
even if it does not violate any particular rule.”172  The same could be said of disregarding 
constitutional role morality more generally. 
A key advantage of deriving the substantive content of constitutional role morality in part 
from political norms and constitutional conventions is that it renders the normative inquiry 
analytically more tractable. Collective self-governance and an effective federal government help 
explain why role restraints are essential, but they are obviously abstract constitutional purposes. 
By contrast, the historical norms and practices of governmental institutions—and their 
procedural rules as well—can offer more determinate normative guidance. Their existence 
enables inductive, granular inquiries into the restraints that politicians have already developed 
for themselves over relatively long periods of time. They can be mined for normative guidance 
regarding the proper role of elected officials in the American system of government.173 
Yet another qualification is required. Sometimes it may be necessary for presidents and 
members of Congress to violate even important norms and conventions.174 The great classics in 
the literature on political role morality (as a genre) have frequently taken the position that the 
morality of private life does not work in public life—that there is a disconnect between ordinary 
morality and political morality. The general thrust of this literature is that the stakes are so high 
in politics that the nicety of ordinary moral rules need to give way. On this view, consequences 
matter substantially more in the public realm than in the private realm because political decisions 
determine, for example, whether large numbers of people live or die, whether wars and economic 
                                                                                                                                                       
cast their votes according to their independent judgment but shall do no more than formally ratify the results of a 
previous popular vote”).   
170 For example, even though the Constitution is not generally thought by experts to prohibit a party in 
control of Congress from expanding the size of the U.S. Supreme Court to pack it with partisan Justices, any such 
plan to increase the size of the Court would likely encounter intense bipartisan opposition. For a discussion, see 
Bradley & Siegel, supra note 46, at 269–87. For a recent proposal to pack the lower federal courts with conservative 
Republican judges, see generally Steven G. Calabresi & Shams Hirji, Proposed Judgeship Bill (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://thinkprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/calabresi-court-packing-memo.pdf. For an explication of the 
proposal’s profound anti-constitutionality, see Richard Primus, Rulebooks, Playgrounds, and Endgames: A 
Constitutional Analysis of the Calabresi-Hirji Judgeship Proposal, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Nov. 24, 2017), 
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/rulebooks-playgrounds-and-endgames-a-constitutional-analysis-of-the-calabresi-
hirji-judgeship-proposal/.  
171 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 27 (discussing the constitutional convention that prohibits the president 
from politicizing federal criminal law enforcement).  
172  Whittington, supra note 167, at 1852. Likewise, under Dicey’s account, violating a constitutional 
convention is considered a breach of “constitutional morality.” DICEY, supra note 168, at 346. 
173 Consider, for example, the procedural rules of the U.S. Congress. There are many ways in which a 
legislature may choose to structure such significant matters as member voting rules, committee operations, floor 
debates, and various balances of power (between the majority party and the minority party, between party leaders 
and the rank-and-file, and between committee chairs and committee members). Congress has made specific choices 
about those matters and many others. 
174 I thank Dick Fallon for emphasizing this point to me.  
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depressions begin or end, and whether demagogues come to power or are defeated.175 While this 
view can easily be overstated or misused to rationalize troubling behavior by politicians, there is 
no doubt truth in the conviction that sometimes the stakes are so high in politics that even 
venerable norms and conventions must give way. 
More controversially, federal politicians may bear some responsibility to practice 
moderation and compromise, at least presumptively.176 That responsibility may include some 
obligation not to take everything that they can get away with taking in an interaction with other 
politicians.177 Such self-restraint would likely require elected officials to adopt a longer-term 
institutional perspective and to possess a certain amount of respect for Americans on the other 
side of the issue under consideration.178 Cashing out substantive role expectations in that way 
can help maintain a meaningful level of social solidarity and cohesion. It can also help the 
federal government function more effectively and with greater stability. In a deeply polarized 
society, perhaps political steps should ordinarily be smaller in length and more cautious in 
placement.179 
To be plausible, however, a presumption in favor of moderation and compromise would 
have to be rebuttable and responsive to the extant conditions of political life. There have been 
times in American history when proposed forms of immoderacy and stridency were themselves 
                                                
175 See NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Tim Parks trans. 2009) (1532); Max Weber, Politics as a 
Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77-128 (Hans H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans. & eds., 
1946) (1919); Michael Walzer, The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160 (1973); Thomas Nagel, 
Ruthlessness in Public Life, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 75–91 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978). The 
relationship between private morality and public morality is a topic that is too rich and difficult for this Article to 
address. 
176 See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, THE SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE: WHY GOVERNING DEMANDS IT 
AND CAMPAIGNING UNDERMINES IT 1 (2012) (“Compromise is difficult, but governing a democracy without 
compromise is impossible.”); Jackson, supra note 14, at 1766 (arguing that, “for a multi-member, heterogeneous 
democratic legislative assembly, the ‘spirit of compromise’ is an essential attribute to get done the public’s work of 
governing”).  
177 That potential component of a restraining role morality for elected officials bears similarities to the idea 
of “fair play” in sports and due process jurisprudence. For a discussion, see Foley, supra note 42, at 686–93. Foley 
conceives of fair play as “a societal norm that constrains partisan competition.” Id. at 688. On his account, 
“[c]onduct of partisans that breaches the norm of fair play would be, intrinsically, an instance of excessive 
partisanship, or what we could call partisan overreaching.” Id. at 688. Unlike this Article, Professor Foley does not 
distinguish legal from other restraints, perhaps because he seeks more vigorous judicial review of election laws. 
178 See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 176, at 3 (“Resistance to democratic compromise can be kept 
in check by a . . . cluster of attitudes and arguments—a compromising mindset—which favors adapting one’s 
principles and respecting one’s opponents.”). Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 50 (defending incompletely theorized 
judgments in part as an “effort[] to achieve both social stability and a degree of reciprocity, together with mutual 
respect, under conditions that threaten to endanger these important values”). 
179 It is not necessary that every member of a plural body, whether Congress or a law school faculty, be 
willing to practice moderation and compromise. Indeed, members who articulate more extreme views can help hold 
moderates accountable for their compromises. What is necessary, however, is that there exist a core group of 
institutionalists who play that role and who are influential. Other components of constitutional role morality, such as 
not belittling members of the other political party or spreading falsehoods, should bind all members of the body. 
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arguably justifiable. Reconstruction may be a good example. 180  The New Deal may be 
another. The Civil Rights Era may be a third. There are issues, especially moral ones involving 
basic human dignity or equality guarantees or economic security, regarding which a president or 
member of Congress may not be able to compromise and must simply and entirely disappoint 
Americans on the other side. 
One might go further and argue that immoderacy and stridency are always justifiable for 
the have-nots, precisely because tacit norms in the United States construct demands for justice as 
immoderacy and stridency. On that view, the lesson of past mobilizations is that norms of civility 
are just so much window dressing for status hierarchies. The claim is worth taking seriously, but 
it does not counsel rejecting the idea of a constitutional role morality for elected officials.  
As an initial matter, the norms and conventions that apply to government officials may be 
different from the ones that apply to social movements and private activists. For example, it is at 
least plausible to think that movement activists, who do not represent their agonists or the nation 
as a whole, are justified in pushing harder for social change than most elected officials should be 
willing to push at a given point in time. Even assuming otherwise, not every past mobilization 
has succeeded only through immoderacy and stridency. For example, both the Civil Rights 
Movement and Second-Wave feminism involved a good deal of strategic incrementalism, 
compromise, and appeals to Americans on the other side of the issue in question.181 In addition, 
it is not clear why immoderacy and stridency are characteristically more likely to help 
traditionally excluded groups persuade Americans who possess power to take their claims 
seriously; immoderacy and stridency can also cause people of good will to recoil. Finally, this 
Article illustrates that norms of civility and related norms are not simply window dressing for 
status hierarchies. They also help make it possible for people with very different worldviews to 
go on living together by working out their conflicts without resorting to violence.182   
That said, another, related caveat regarding compromise is warranted. It is critical for 
elected officials to bear in mind who is not in the room when compromises are hashed out.183 
There are well-known instances in American history in which political compromises came at the 
expense of people who lacked economic and political power. For example, the celebrated 
historian G. Van Woodward described the plight of African Americans in the South after 
Reconstruction ended pursuant to a political compromise between Southern Democrats and the 
                                                
180 Even during Reconstruction, however, seven Republican senators refused to vote to remove President 
Andrew Johnson from office for patently partisan reasons. For a moving, detailed discussion of that episode, see 
Foley, supra note 42, at 693–708.    
181 See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, “Equal Citizenship Stature”: Justice Ginsburg’s Constitutional Vision, 43 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 799, 843–53 (2009) (discussing Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s characteristically incremental, moderate 
approach to realizing her constitutional vision of gender equality). 
182 Cf. Reva B. Siegel, Community in Conflict: Same-Sex Marriage and Backlash, 64 UCLA L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017) (“Conflict channeled through the role understandings of constitutional culture is crucial in 
directing the growth and sustaining the authority of our constitutional law. . . . For conflict to serve these ends, 
however, it must be constrained. Whether we ground these constraints in text, structure, or the unwritten 
Constitution, or call these constraints law, gloss, norms, or conventions, the vitality of these role constraints is key to 
the strength and to the character of a constitutional democracy.”). 
183 I thank Ruth Colker for underscoring this point.    
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Republican Party.184 “The determination of the Negro’s ‘place’ took shape gradually,” he wrote, 
“under the influence of economic and political conflicts among divided white people—conflicts 
that were eventually resolved in part at the expense of the Negro.”185 In current times, potential 
compromises over gun control risk trading in false and damaging stereotypes about disabled 
Americans. 186  Elected officials should always be alert to the possibility that proposed 
compromises reflect or reinforce the inferior social status of historically excluded groups in 
American society.187 
Again, when to compromise and when to refuse is not a theoretical question; answering it 
in particular contexts requires political judgment. But much of the time on important policy 
issues, the above risks do not predominate and there are multiple, cross-cutting concerns, not all 
of which fracture Americans into two diametrically opposed camps. Alternatively, there is a 
broad level of agreement on the existence of a problem but sharp disagreement about how best 
to address it. In such circumstances, moderation and compromise are possible. It is often partisan 
identity and an aversion in principle to compromise that get in the way.  
One final qualification is needed, and it is an important one. In developing a 
constitutional role morality for elected officials of the federal government, a persistent problem 
lies in balancing words like “modest,” “experimental,” and “pragmatic” with the possibility of a 
dramatic political shift that is legitimated by a special democratic warrant to act. Bruce 
Ackerman’s influential theory of constitutional moments is built around the possibility of 
supermajorities, over sustained periods of time, with clear statements of objectives and 
stakes.188 Whether Ackerman is right or wrong about the grounds of legitimate constitutional 
change, he is surely right that strong, sustained supermajority support is relevant to politically 
                                                
184 C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 6 (3d rev. ed. 1974). The Compromise of 
1877, as it was called, required Southern Democrats to withdraw their support for Democrat Samuel J. Tilden, who 
they argued had been elected president, and instead to support Republican Rutherford B. Hayes, in exchange for the 
end of Reconstruction. As Vann Woodward wrote, “[t]he phase that began in 1877 was inaugurated by the 
withdrawal of federal troops from the South, the abandonment of the Negro as a ward of the nation, the giving up of 
the attempt to guarantee the freedman his civil and political equality, and the acquiescence of the rest of the country 
in the South’s demand that the whole problem be left to the disposition of the dominant Southern white people.” Id. 
185 Id. 
186  See, e.g., David Perry, Paul Ryan’s “Mental Health” Focus Is a Sham, CNN (Oct. 5, 2017), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/05/opinions/paul-ryan-mental-health-guns-sham-david-perry/index.html (“Only 3% to 
5% of all violent crimes involve people with psychiatric disabilities, including conditions such as schizophrenia or 
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more scholarly argument that singling out individuals with mental disorders for disparate treatment is often 
unjustified, see generally Sherry F. Colb, Insane Fear: The Discriminatory Category of “Mentally Ill and 
Dangerous,” 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 341 (1999). 
187  This concern partially animates the insistence of critical theorists that members of historically 
subordinated groups be included in the composition of legislatures in sufficient numbers to potentially impact 
legislative outcomes. For prominent expressions of that insistence or of related concerns about the suppression of 
minority voices in the legislative process, see generally LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: 
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994); MELISSA WILLIAMS, VOICE, TRUST, AND 
MEMORY: MARGINALIZED GROUPS AND THE FAILING OF LIBERAL REPRESENTATION (1998); IRIS MARION YOUNG, 
JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990); and IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY (2000). 
188 See supra note 14 (citing Ackerman’s relevant works).  
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appropriate change—and therefore, to how restraining a role morality for elected officials should 
be at a particular point in political time. But radical and dramatic change is the exception in 
American politics, not the rule. And the circumstances of American politics today approach the 
antithesis of the circumstances that Ackerman describes as licensing radical change. 
 
C. What about the Affordable Care Act? 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was the most significant 
legislative legacy of Democratic President Barack Obama.189 A Democratic Congress passed the 
statute over vehement Republican opposition, 190  and without a single Republican vote, 191 
notwithstanding the fact that it was the most significant expansion of the social safety net in the 
United States in almost half a century. 192  In addition, congressional Democrats ultimately 
resorted to an unconventional legislative process in order to enact the law.193 According to public 
opinion polls, moreover, popular majorities opposed the statute for years, and the ACA achieved 
majority support in the nation only recently, as it was being threatened with repeal by a 
Republican president and Congress.194 Most Americans continue to believe that parts of the law 
                                                
189 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 
U.S.C.); see Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).  
190 See Walker Ray & Tim Norbeck, A Look Back at How the President Was Able to Sign Obamacare into 
Law Four Years Ago, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/physiciansfoundation/2014/03/26/a-
look-back-at-how-the-president-was-able-to-sign-obamacare-into-law-four-years-ago/#164e481d526b 
(“Republicans invoked Thomas Jefferson’s observation that ‘great innovations should not be forced on a slender 
majority – or enacted without broad support.’ They cited broad legislative innovations like Social Security and 
Medicare, both of which enjoyed bipartisan support. They complained that one fewer vote in the Senate or a change 
of four votes in the House would have been enough to defeat ObamaCare.”) 
191  See, e.g., Shailagh Murray & Lori Montgomery, House Passes Health-Care Reform Bill without 
Republican Votes, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/21/AR2010032100943.html.  
192 See, e.g., THE STAFF OF THE WASHINGTON POST, LANDMARK: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA’S NEW 
HEALTH-CARE LAW AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US ALL 66–67 (2010) [hereinafter LANDMARK] (calling the ACA 
“the biggest expansion of the social safety net in more than four decades, providing greater economic security to 
millions of poor and working-class families”). 
193 See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015): 
Congress wrote key parts of the Act behind closed doors, rather than through “the traditional 
legislative process.” And Congress passed much of the Act using a complicated budgetary 
procedure known as “reconciliation,” which limited opportunities for debate and amendment, and 
bypassed the Senate’s normal 60-vote filibuster requirement.  
Id. at 2492 (quoting and citing John Cannan, A Legislative History of the Affordable Care Act: How Legislative 
Procedure Shapes Legislative History, 105 L. LIBR. J. 131, 159–67 (2013)). 
194 See Hannah Fingerhut, Support for 2010 Health Care Law Reaches New High, PEW RESEARCH CENTER 
(Feb. 23, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/02/23/support-for-2010-health-care-law-reaches-new-
high/ (finding that Americans approve the ACA by a margin of 54 to 43 percent, and that “[f]or the first time, [the] 
2010 health care law draws majority approval”); Quinnipiac University Poll, March 8, 2017, at 6 [hereinafter March 
2017 Quinnipiac Poll], https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=2437 (finding that Americans think 
“Donald Trump should [not] support efforts to repeal the Affordable Care Act” by a margin of 51 to 45 percent). 
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should be repealed (while other parts should be kept).195 Given all of those considerations, how 
could it have been consistent with the constitutional role morality just sketched for Democratic 
politicians to have passed the ACA? If a role morality for elected officials has any bite at all, 
then should it not have counseled against passage of that law?  
Those are fair questions, and they deserve an answer, particularly from a scholar who 
devoted much time to defending the constitutionality of the law.196 But the importance of the 
questions far transcends the continued controversy surrounding the ACA. A more general way to 
frame the issue is whether widespread adoption of a constitutional role morality for elected 
officials would rule out major, controversial actions by the federal government. If elected 
officials acted the way this Article would have them act, could Congress still pass a statute like 
the ACA? If so, would it need to follow a different process from the one the ACA Congress 
followed? 
Although reasonable minds will differ about what constitutional role morality required of 
Democratic politicians given the considerations described above, the most persuasive answer (in 
this author’s view) is not what is implied by the selective arrangement of the facts previously 
noted. The ACA was not a partisan innovation or bolt from the blue; on the contrary, it was the 
culmination of many decades of failed attempts at bipartisan health care reform.197 Moreover, the 
White House and Democratic leaders made efforts to reach out to Republican members of 
Congress rhetorically and procedurally, and Democrats incorporated some of the Republicans’ 
past and present substantive ideas.198  In addition, Democratic leaders held numerous public 
hearings, developed an extensive legislative record, and voted after the Congressional Budget 
Office scored the various bills. In the end, the process entailed more than a year of legislative 
                                                
195 See March 2017 Quinnipiac Poll, supra note 194, at 9 (finding that 21 percent of Americans think 
“President Trump and the Republicans in Congress should repeal all of the Affordable Care Act, also known as 
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196 See generally, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory of 
the Tax Power, 99 VA. L. REV. 1195 (2012); Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence, supra note 134; Neil S. Siegel, 
Four Constitutional Limits that the Minimum Coverage Provision Respects, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 591 (2011). 
197  See, e.g., Robert B. Reich, Critical Care, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/books/review/Reich-t.html (reviewing DAVID BLUMENTHAL & JAMES A. 
MORONE, THE HEART OF POWER: HEALTH AND POLITICS IN THE OVAL OFFICE (2010)) (“Universal health care has 
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198  See, e.g., Norm Ornstein, The Real Story of Obamacare’s Birth, THE ATLANTIC (July 6, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/the-real-story-of-obamacares-birth/397742/ (discussing the 
efforts of key Senate Democrats to begin with Republican ideas and proceed on a bipartisan basis, and documenting 
the eventual refusal of Senate Republicans to participate in such a process); Glenn Kessler, History Lesson: How the 
Democrats Pushed Obamacare through the Senate, WASH. POST (June 22, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/06/22/history-lesson-how-the-democrats-pushed-
obamacare-through-the-senate/?utm_term=.1231f4956427 (“Democrats at first tried to enlist some Republican 
support, while Republicans have not reached out to Democrats.”); LANDMARK, supra note 192, at 68 (noting that the 
ACA is a “market-based approach” that “bears clear resemblance to the leading Republican alternative to the 
Clinton plan, to proposals developed by the conservative Heritage Foundation, and to the 2006 legislation signed by 
Republican Governor Mitt Romney that created universal coverage in Massachusetts”).   
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effort and public scrutiny.199 The procedural shortcuts for which Democrats deserve blame in 
passing the ACA pale in comparison to how Republicans have since repeatedly proceeded in 
attempting to repeal and replace the law.200 And because substance matters too in assessing what 
role morality requires of politicians in particular circumstances, it is also relevant that the statute 
seeks to address what is fairly described as a human tragedy and serious economic problem: tens 
of millions of Americans who lack health insurance and thus access to basic, affordable health 
care.201 
There is more. Parts of the law have always been popular (namely, the provisions that 
protect people from being denied coverage based on pre-existing conditions or charged higher 
premiums based on medical history), and those parts are tied functionally to the provision of the 
law that was probably least popular (the so-called individual mandate). 202  Those facts may 
suggest that much of the public did not understand how the statute was designed to work. Even 
now, unified Republican government has resulted in repeated failures to repeal the law,203 
although the individual mandate was repealed by the recently enacted tax law.204 To reiterate, 
                                                
199 See, e.g., Brian Beutler, Republicans Thinks Capitol Hill’s Rules Are for Suckers, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 
9, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/139707/republicans-think-capitol-hills-rules-suckers (“Obamacare was 
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200 See, e.g., Thomas Kaplan & Robert Pear, Senate Republicans Say They Will Not Vote on Health Bill, 
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feature of the crafting of Obamacare.”); Reich, supra note 197 (noting that “the cost estimates of the Congressional 
Budget Office set [President Obama] back”).   
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fifty million people, lacked health insurance in 2009. U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance 
Coverage in the United States: 2009, at 23 (2010). 
202 For a discussion, see Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence, supra note 134, at 38–40. In brief, the 
financial incentive to purchase insurance combats the perverse incentive people would otherwise have to wait until 
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Lost., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/us/politics/mcconnell-gambled-on-health-
care-and-the-alabama-senate-race-he-
lost.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FHealth%20Care%20Reform&action=click&contentCollection=timestop
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204 See, e.g., Joel Dodge, Can Obamacare Survive Without the Individual Mandate?, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 
3, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/146462/can-obamacare-survive-without-individual-mandate.  
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there were key parts of the ACA’s drafting process that left much to be desired,205 but others did 
not and, overall, it does not seem an abuse of political power for the Democrats to have 
eventually decided to go it alone. After decades of failure and unwavering Republican opposition 
at the time, it would likely have been asking too much of the Democrats to wait another decade 
or more to achieve their objective of helping the uninsured. A constitutional role morality is not 
infinitely constraining, but that does not mean it is not constraining at all.  
Other commentators will no doubt disagree with the above analysis. Dissensus will likely 
be attributable in part—but only in part—to substantive disagreements about the wisdom or 
constitutionality of the ACA. Just as questions of judicial role generate robust disagreements,206 
so will issues of political role if the idea of a constitutional role morality takes hold. Such 
disagreements are, to a substantial extent, healthy—far healthier than simply assuming or 
asserting the absence of a constitutional role morality applicable to elected officials. 
Disagreement generates dialogue, and dialogue helps fashion and fortify the very role restraints 
whose applicability is at issue.207  
 To be sure, disagreement is not only healthy. The risk is that a common commitment to 
the idea of a constitutional role morality will end up recapitulating the very partisan conflicts it is 
attempting to temper.208 It may be unduly pessimistic, however, to conclude that such a common 
commitment would be both genuine and completely unrestraining. Forcing politicians to justify 
their conduct in terms of constitutional role morality—in terms of due regard for the political 
opposition, the nation as a whole, and the institutions in which they serve—would itself be an 
improvement over the status quo. As discussed above,209 rhetoric helps shape reality, and in any 
event, requiring such justificatory rhetoric would help “smoke out” excessively partisan 
purposes. Just as Republicans condemned parts of the process through which the ACA was 
enacted, so Democrats are currently demanding public-spirited justifications from Republicans. 
And Republicans may again be asking the same of Democrats after the 2018 and 2020 elections. 
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IV. ROLE ALLOCATIONS 
 Constitutional law scholarship that further develops a role morality for elected officials 
will have implications for how different actors in the American constitutional system should 
execute their professional responsibilities if they are to make it more likely that such a role 
morality will eventually be embraced and sustained. This Part examines those implications and 
actors. In addition to politicians themselves, they include citizens broadly, school teachers, law 
teachers, and Americans who oppose aggressive action by a presidential administration or 
Congress. 
 
A. Elected Officials and Citizens 
The challenge for elected officials is to consider not just the legal authority that they 
possess as a result of formal electoral processes, but also the political authority that they can 
acquire only from reaching out to a broader range of Americans than their political base. Just as 
non-legal but presumptively obligatory norms of the system may require judges to moderate in 
various ways, so elected officials should come to respect a role morality something like the one 
sketched in Part III. Of course, such norm internalization by politicians is unlikely in the short-
to-medium run. For example, no one should expect President Trump, senior members of his 
administration, or congressional Republicans to be much moved by arguments that they are 
obliged to moderate. One should expect some Republicans and Democrats up for re-election in 
2018 or 2020 who do not occupy safe seats to conclude that it is in their political self-interest to 
moderate with respect to some issues. But the pursuit of political self-interest is not the same 
phenomenon as the internalization of a political norm.210  
Given the short-to-medium term prospects for success, arguments of the sort being 
tendered in this Article are easily dismissed as being suggested by electoral losers and ignored by 
elector winners. Yet such arguments may also fall on deaf ears in the case of assertive jurists. 
Even so, it is worth repeating the point of Part I: generations of constitutional law scholars, law 
teachers, and other participants in American constitutional discourse have made such arguments 
to judges all the while knowing that many judges, including pivotal Justices, may be unwilling to 
heed them. The hope seems to have been that in general, over the long run, and at certain key 
moments, such arguments may make an important difference.211 It does not seem entirely fair to 
dismiss as electoral losers legal scholars and others who “hold onto a set of expectations for 
lawyers, politicians, judges, or legal scholars like themselves, even in the face of evidence that 
those expectations frequently and repeatedly go unmet.”212 Relatedly, it does not seem accurate 
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to charge this Article with making inconsistent assumptions about what motivates government 
officials.213 The Article is arguing that more public-regarding and institution-minded motivations 
from elected officials would better sustain the constitutional system. It is hardly assuming that 
elected officials will be so motivated any time soon just because it would be valuable for them to 
be so motivated.  
In order to eventually instill such normative expectations in politicians, it is essential to 
also try instilling them in their constituents (not to mention the donors, party officials, media 
outlets, and others who constitute the environment in which elected officials must function). 
How to do so is beyond this author’s expertise and the sphere of influence of constitutional law 
scholars more generally. That said, enhancing civic education for young Americans (contrary to 
current trends) seems like a good idea, as important as STEM fields also are, and as naïve as the 
suggestion may sound.214 Imagine teaching the next several generations of schoolchildren that 
voters, like elected officials, soldiers, and jurors, hold an important public office, and that as 
trustees, they are “charged with the responsibility of acting on behalf of society as a whole, 
present and future.”215 Figuring out ways to reach the broader public and other players who 
surround elected officials would, among other virtues, afford politicians some normative “space” 
in which to function in a more public-regarding and institution-minded way.  
 
B. Law Teachers 
If politicians are going to learn such lessons over the longer run, then others are going to 
have to teach them when they are younger and more impressionable. A noble charge for law 
teachers, including constitutional law teachers, would be for them to develop ideas, curricula, 
and methods aimed at instructing future political leaders—not just future judges—that a 
constitutional role morality applies to them.216 More generally, law teachers might impress upon 
their students the point that federal judges and elected officials are not only different (although 
                                                
213 See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1743 (2013) (criticizing scholars who first adopt the “external” perspective of political scientists by assuming that 
government officials pursue their self-interest, and then propose to solve the problems such self-interest creates by 
adopting the “internal,” normative perspective of law professors—a solution whose success requires governmental 
officials (usually judges) to act in the public interest, not their own).  
214 See Edward B. Foley, Voters as Fiduciaries, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 153, 190 (2015) (emphasizing the 
need to “put in place a curriculum that prepare[s] citizens appropriately for the fiduciary responsibility of being a 
voter,” so that “[c]ivics education . . . would not be shunted as an afterthought, subordinated to the so-called 
‘STEM’ subjects of science, technology, engineering, and math”). 
215 Id. at 162–63; see id. at 163 (“Just as any other trustee breaches his or her fiduciary duty when using the 
trust’s assets to promote the trustee’s own personal self-interest, so too voters breach their fiduciary duties to society 
as a whole, present and future, if they exploit the electorate’s power over the assets of the commonwealth to promote 
their own personal self-interest.”). Professor Foley makes the intriguing suggestion of adopting a “voter’s oath” 
analogous to the oaths that legislators must affirm. Id. at 191. 
216 Cf. Joe Palazzolo, In Short Supply in Donald Trump’s Cabinet: Lawyers, WALL ST. J. (March 2, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-short-supply-in-donald-trumps-cabinet-lawyers-1488463200 (quoting legal scholar 
Craig Green as stating that “[l]egal training orients people toward tradition and institutions, directing them to think 
about change in an incremental way and to explain and justify the way things are”).  
	 46	
they are); they are also, in certain key respects, more similar than has traditionally been thought 
by constitutional law scholars. Both sets of actors possess, or should possess, role restraints on 
their pursuit of substantive objectives. And in both realms, fundamental questions arise about 
how it is appropriate to use the power one possesses in the face of broad and deep disagreement. 
Law teachers could also engage their students as citizens, not just future lawyers and political 
leaders, and instruct them that high levels of polarization and animus between members of the 
two main political parties imperil the constitutional system. 
This Article has examined the role responsibilities of presidents and members of 
Congress by asking into the relationship between various kinds of restraints on partisanship and 
the accomplishment of vital constitutional purposes. There are, of course, other ways to theorize 
and teach about the role restraints, or lack thereof, that attach to political office. As discussed 
above, the great classics of political morality have tended to argue that the stakes are so high in 
politics that ordinary morality must give way.217 By contrast, Arthur Applbaum, in his seminal 
book on role morality, argues that political, legal, and business “[i]nstitutions and the roles they 
create ordinarily cannot mint moral permissions to do what otherwise would be morally 
prohibited.”218  
Scholars of the legal profession are also focused on issues of role morality. For example, 
W. Bradley Wendel describes truthfulness in public life as “an ethical ideal,” and he argues that 
“[s]eeking to learn the truth and communicate it accurately to other people are virtues that are 
necessary to a common form of life characterized by trust, respect, and the protection of human 
dignity”219 Moreover, there is an important sub-debate in the literature about the role morality of 
government lawyers. During the Bush administration, for example, there was much thinking 
about their role morality, especially in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel.220  
In addition to work on role morality, writing on leadership is pertinent to scholarship and 
teaching that means to educate future politicians during their time in law school. There have 
traditionally been many ideas about, and accounts of, leadership in such disciplines as law, 
sociology, and history.221 There is also much modern research on leadership in a number of 
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fields.222 Academic research on leadership may sit in fascinating tension with the basic insight 
that “[c]ontext is everything” in determining what leadership requires in a particular situation.223  
Also relevant are potential historical exemplars of leadership or its antithesis in politics, 
both in the United States and in other democracies.224 Those exemplars could be developed as 
case studies, in much the way that certain judicial biographies and judicial decisions serve as 
case studies of success or failure in fulfilling the responsibilities of the judicial role.225 The 
discussions of Burke, Madison, Washington, and Jefferson in this Article, which draw upon the 
views of some of the most widely respected and venerable political figures from the American 
Founding (if one is not examining issues of race or gender), can be understood as gestures in a 
profitable direction. And there are no doubt numerous “contra” examples from different 
historical eras that could be analyzed. There is room for such discussions in constitutional law 
classes, particular if the professor emphasizes the role of constitutional interpretation and 
leadership outside the courts. For example, one leading casebook includes excerpts of historic 
addresses or writings by Frederick Douglass, Abraham Lincoln, Jacob Howard, Susan B. 
Anthony, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Martin Luther King, Jr., John F. Kennedy, Hubert H. 
Humphrey, Everett McKinley Dirksen, and Lyndon B. Johnson, among others.226  
So as not to become discouraged, law professors (as well as other academics and non-
academics) who accept this invitation will have to keep their expectations relatively modest, at 
least in the short-to-medium run. Legal academics have greater influence over judges than they 
do over legislators and executive officials, for at least two reasons. First, all judges, but only 
some legislators and executive officials, are lawyers. Second, notwithstanding complaints by 
Chief Justice John Roberts, D.C. Circuit Judge Harry Edwards, and some other judges about the 
uselessness of law review articles to judges,227 many judges (including in all likelihood the Chief 
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Justice) in fact consult at least some of the law review literature.228 More generally, judges care 
about maintaining a good relationship with the legal academy for reasons that may not apply as 
readily to members of the elected branches. Those reasons include shared intellectual interests 
and the fact that the law schools supply law clerks.  
Still, law schools could develop a more robust relationship with the political branches by 
reconceptualizing them in the way this Article proposes, even if that relationship would still not 
be as close as it is with the judiciary any time soon. Law schools could also cultivate a closer 
relationship with the political branches by developing more of a practice of sending their 
graduates to serve members of Congress and executive branch officials, in addition to judges. 
For example, a step in the right direction would be passage of the Congressional Clerkship Act, 
which would create a congressional version of the federal judicial clerkship program. Proponents 
of the Congressional Clerkship Act seek to address the general lack of legislative work 
experience among members of the legal profession and to help bridge the divide between the 
legislative and judicial branches.229 Were members of Congress to take it seriously as a way of 
accessing young legal talent, a congressional clerkship program would also have the virtue of 
developing closer ties between the legal academy and Congress.   
 
C. The Opposition 
Finally, the vision offered in this Article has implications for practices of political 
resistance. Few engaged participants in the constitutional system would be persuaded to accept 
aggressive judicial behavior based only on such statements as “appointments have 
consequences” or “it’s just judging” for federal judges to strongly advance ideological agendas. 
Likewise, it is not clear why opposition politicians, members of the news media, the institutions 
of civil society, and concerned citizens should accept as conversation stoppers assertions by 
those in political power or their defenders that “elections have consequences” or “it’s just 
politics” for politicians to forcefully advance ideological agendas. They should instead regard 
themselves as entitled to vigorously contest the constitutional legitimacy of exercises of partisan 
political power when elected officials seek to justify acting in narrowly partisan ways by 
invoking the outcome of the previous election.  
The closest one observes to such pushback in contemporary political discourse can be 
found in debates over whether a new president is “legitimate” or has a “mandate” to govern. 
Debates over whether a particular president is “legitimate,” however, often miss the distinction 
between legal legitimacy and what this Article terms constitutional legitimacy. Legal legitimacy 
for a president inheres in winning a sufficient number of votes in the Electoral College. 
Constitutional legitimacy, it is worth repeating, cannot be earned by winning only bare majority 
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support, let alone minority support, throughout the nation for the lion’s share of one’s policies, 
priorities, and conduct in office. As for whether a new president has a “mandate” to govern, that 
is one good question to ask because the existence of a mandate can be interpreted as implying a 
certain level of inclusivity beyond bare majority support. But even the existence of a genuine 
electoral mandate (an unlikely phenomenon in current times) should not free elected officials to 
ignore their political opponents or the best interests of the institutions in which they serve. 
Fully appreciating that a constitutional role morality applies to elected officials holds the 
potential to catalyze—and to legitimate—practices of robust, confident political resistance. Role 
restraints on presidents and members of Congress can serve as a constitutional anchor point for 
the full-throated expression of such resistance and would help inspire Americans not to relent 
when they are advised that “elections have consequences.” Elections do have consequences, but 
those consequences may in particular instances not be what those who utter that statement mean 
to imply. Rather than stopping a conversation about the exercise of political will, the idea that 
elections have consequences should invite a conversation about what, exactly, the previous 
election has settled—and what it has not. 
 
V. OBJECTIONS 
This Part anticipates two objections to this Article’s project. The first is that 
constitutional law scholars should not focus on developing a constitutional role morality for 
elected officials, but should instead work on redesigning the institutional environments within 
which politicians operate. The second objection, already anticipated in Part IV.A, is that the 
vision set forth in this Article faces severe implementation problems. 
 
A. First Objection: Institutional Structure, Not Role Morality 
This Article may be faulted for focusing on the development of role restraints of 
questionable enforceability, and not on the redesign of the institutional environments within 
which elected officials operate. Policing partisan gerrymanders, for example, would obviously 
change the incentives of many members of the House of Representatives.230 And there are a 
variety of new laws that a future Congress could pass, and a future president could sign into law, 
that would enshrine various role restraints into law—for example, statutes requiring presidential 
candidates to release their tax returns and divest of their business holdings. On the state level, 
open primaries would combat partisan extremism. Why emphasize an ineffective role morality 
instead of a more effective set of rules and structural reforms?  
The most important response to this objection is that the two approaches are not mutually 
exclusive. Role restraints should be viewed as a complement to, not a substitute for, work that 
proposes new rules and a reconfiguration of governmental institutions. Given the magnitude of 
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the self-governance and collective action problems facing the nation, a both-and approach is 
preferable anyway to focusing exclusively on one or the other. The two approaches are also 
related in that politicians who have, to some degree, internalized a role morality of the sort 
championed in this Article are most likely to support public-spirited rules and structural reforms. 
James Madison may have been right in Federalist 51 to emphasize institutional architecture first 
and role restraints second,231 but it may be worth repeating that he placed significant value on 
both.232 Notwithstanding statements like those in Federalist 51 that “[a]mbition must be made to 
counteract ambition” and “[t]he interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional 
rights of the place,”233 Madison did not believe that it would suffice for elected representatives to 
possess little or no virtue or regard for the public good. Nor should Americans so believe today. 
Another response is that rules and structures by themselves are very unlikely to succeed 
without elected officials who are, to some non-trivial extent, properly normalized into a role. 
There are just too many ways of successfully violating or circumventing rules and structures or 
of behaving badly within the zones of discretion that they sensibly confer in order to enable 
adaptation to unforeseeable circumstances. As legal scholar Justin Levitt writes, “[s]ubstantive 
rules and institutional structure alone are insufficient to constrain certain forms of partisanship in 
theory, or to explain their absence in practice. It takes more than zoning permission and a good 
architect to make a house a home.”234 Imagine trying to run a law school or a political science 
department, which depends heavily for its success on a widespread willingness to do institutional 
work and participate in the intellectual life of the institution, with a faculty and staff that 
responds only to rules, structures, and perceptions of political or financial costs and benefits.  
 To the extent the objection under consideration is actually focused on the relative realism 
of institutional structure and role morality and not on their relative efficacy, a final response is 
that it does not seem fair to criticize role restraints as unrealistic and then turn around and 
propose structural reforms that may themselves be unrealistic. Because the institutional 
environment is relatively fixed for the foreseeable future, at least as a general matter, Americans 
living today are not well situated to think as constitutional framers do. The U.S. Constitution is 
extraordinarily difficult to amend, whether through the traditional method (initial proposal by 
two-thirds of each House of Congress), or through the method that has never before been used (a 
convention of the fifty states called for by two-thirds of the state legislatures).235 Either way, it 
requires only thirteen states to defeat a proposed amendment, and it is very likely that at least 
thirteen states will reject proposals that are controversial, such as the balanced budget 
amendment touted by conservative advocacy groups that in recent years have been pursuing a 
convention of the states.236 
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That said, some important rules and practices (like the filibuster and regular order237) are 
sub-constitutional and do not even require legislation in order to preserve, re-introduce, or 
terminate. Other problems, including partisan gerrymanders, may be ameliorated through 
legislation, referenda, or judicial decisions. Again, it is worthwhile to propose and pursue 
structural changes that would enhance collective self-governance and collective action, including 
changes that do not seem likely to take place any time soon. But it is hard to see how developing 
a constitutional role morality alongside structural proposals would make such changes less, as 
opposed to more, likely to occur. 
 
B. Second Objection: Implementation 
A second, related objection is that the vision offered in this Article faces daunting 
implementation questions. What incentives do elected officials have to moderate their behavior 
beyond legality? In an age of hyper-partisanship, do not the bases and donors of the two main 
political parties pressure elected officials not to moderate, and are not federal judges more 
insulated from such political pressure? Even worse, to the extent political scientists are correct 
that the two parties are asymmetrically polarized, 238  this Article’s call for practices of 
moderation, compromise, mutual respect, and restraint risks being dismissed by one side of the 
ideological and partisan divide as itself ideological and partisan.239  
Part IV initiated a conversation about some of those questions: it is important to 
challenge legal academics to develop a constitutional role morality for elected officials; to 
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challenge the public to expect their elected representatives to comply with one; to challenge 
politicians to live it out; to devote greater, not fewer, resources to civic education; and to stop 
teaching that politics is a realm in which people get to do pretty much whatever they want within 
the bounds of the law. But this Article cannot adequately answer questions about 
implementation. As noted at the outset, solutions to the problem of political polarization and ill 
will obviously depend upon their causes.240 Because this Article has not examined those causes, 
it has not proposed any short-to-medium-term solutions beyond efforts at education, which may 
help whatever the primary causes. The Article has instead offered a normative account of the role 
responsibilities of presidents and members of Congress that, if embraced by politicians and 
others, would help sustain the constitutional project. The account offered here can be discussed 
and debated on its own terms—that is, independent of concerns about implementation.  
Another implementation problem concerns the strategic environment in which elected 
officials must act. Even if a politician were persuaded by the account offered here, she could 
reasonably ask why her “side” of the political aisle should “disarm” without knowing whether 
the other side would follow suit. There is obviously a collective action problem, and unilateral 
disarmament is unlikely to prove a good strategy.241 A role morality approach works only if it is 
relatively reciprocal; otherwise, those who adopt it risk being “suckers.”242  
That said, several observations are warranted. First, even when acting on a “tit for tat” 
strategy, there is a potentially important difference between doing so with enthusiasm and doing 
so with regret. The latter orientation might inspire public expressions of the conviction that a 
race to the top would be better for all involved than a race to the bottom but that one has no 
reasonable choice but to respond in kind as a way of punishing the other side’s excessive 
partisanship.243  
Second, there is a difference between (1) “tit for tat” responses to bad behavior from the 
other side as a means of sticking up for one’s substantive interests and potentially securing better 
                                                
240 Contributing factors likely include the transformation of the public sphere through old and new media, 
demographic changes in the country and their implications for the Republican Party, gerrymandering on 
technological steroids, and the increased clustering of Democrats in urban areas and Republicans in rural areas. But 
a responsible examination of the issue is beyond the scope of this Article. For an illuminating study of part of the 
problem, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2017) 
(examining how the Internet is driving political fragmentation, polarization, and extremism). 
241 In the current moment, there is at least an argument that conservatives view liberals as fundamentally 
illegitimate in a way that most liberals do not view conservatives (setting aside President Trump). For an articulation 
of that view with respect to legal elites, see Primus, supra note 170 (“Democratic-appointed judges are not to be 
considered a normal part of the system, fit to exercise adjudicative authority because they too are honorable servants 
of the Constitution, even if they understand the Constitution differently from the way we understand it. No. They are 
to be regarded unfit per se.”). 
242  See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Expanding the Judiciary, the Senate Rules, and the Small-c Constitution, 
BALKINIZATION (Nov. 25, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/11/expanding-judiciary-senate-rules-and.html 
(“If you think you’re playing an iterated game and your opponent thinks otherwise, you are (to use a technical term) 
a booby. The strategies you use – in particular, refraining from tit-for-tat responses – will be completely ineffective; 
your opponents will keep on ‘tatting,’ playing you for a sucker.”).   
243 For discussion of collective action problems, races to the bottom, and races to the top, see Cooter & 
Siegel, supra note 134, at 135–44, 161–62. 
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behavior in the future, and (2) responses that escalate a conflict, thereby hastening a race to the 
normative bottom. In other words, one can seek to avoid conflict escalation without unilaterally 
disarming.244 One can no doubt question the usefulness of that distinction, given that what one 
side views as “tit for tat” the other side may be likely to interpret as conflict escalation. Even so, 
the distinction is defensible in principle and is applied in practice in a variety of settings. 
Consider, for example, the distinction in foreign policy circles between economic sanctions and 
military intervention. Moreover, there may be a difference between how politicians characterize 
the other side’s behavior in public and what they understand to be going on in private.  
Finally, is also worth reflecting on whether there are ways of moving beyond “tit for tat” 
interactions and promoting a race to the top. Doing so would likely require incremental, 
confidence-building measures and compromises over extended periods of time. For example, if 
the Democrats had gained control of the Senate in the 2016 elections, they might have done more 
than simply refuse to confirm any Supreme Court nominee not named Merrick Garland (or 
someone ideologically similar). They might have also agreed to consider in good faith future 
Trump nominees once Garland was confirmed. 
Notwithstanding concerns about implementation, this Article’s proposal is worth taking 
seriously because it invites legal scholars to recast their thinking on a fundamental level—and 
arguments on that level find their purchase on one’s overall view of the world more than in their 
short or even medium-term impact on specific decisions. There is a huge difference between a 
constitutional regime in which there are norms and conventions based on role that are often 
violated by elected officials, and a regime in which those norms and conventions are simply not 
thought to exist. This Article is arguing for a reconfiguration of America’s world of political 
decisions. At some point, there is no escaping attention to how the vision could become reality. 
But in a deeply polarized country in which politicians who hold high office too often act as if 
there are no non-legal role restraints, the immediate task is to develop the vision itself. 
Moreover, it is easy to miss the extent to which norms that constrain the worst forms of 
partisanship continue to operate in the present.245 As bad as the current situation is from the 
vantage point of the vision articulated in this Article, the truth is that it could be much worse. For 
example, the Justices are not simply partisans; all (or almost all) of them disappoint the political 
party that appointed them at least some of the time. There are no serious proposals in the political 
branches calling for Court-packing or the impeachment of Justices or judges appointed by 
presidents of the other party. There has not been a wholesale politicization of federal criminal 
law enforcement, even as the longstanding convention of independence from the president 
appears to be under pressure. 246  There is no widespread practice of Republican-appointed 
                                                
244 See Neil S. Siegel, Some Notes on Court Packing, Then and Now, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 27, 2017), 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/11/some-notes-on-court-packing-then-and-now.html (discussing those strategic 
and normative considerations). 
245 Justin Levitt catalogues numerous examples in the three branches of “many public entities that do not 
normally behave in tribally partisan fashion, even when substantive rules and institutional structure would make 
such tribal partisanship possible, and when natural incentives would make it desirable.” Levitt, supra note 234, at 
1830; see id. at 1831–43 (compiling examples). Levitt concludes that “role morality” and “situational norms” are 
doing much of the work. Id. at 1843–53. 
246 See, e.g., Peter Baker & Michael D. Shear, Trump Shifts Rationale for Firing Comey, Calling Him a 
“Showboat,” N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/11/us/politics/trump-comey-
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secretaries of state refusing to certify elections that Democrats won based on highly dubious 
allegations of widespread voter fraud.247 There are, of course, examples that potentially count as 
exceptions to most of the above generalizations, but they do not disprove the rule.248 Nor do the 
generalizations seem entirely explainable in terms of political self-interest. Anyone who thinks 
that normatively unrestrained partisanship could not get substantially more severe in American 
politics lacks imagination, knowledge of comparative politics, or awareness of American 
history.249 
In addition, it is possible to conceive of circumstances that could make this Article’s 
normative account more realistic in the foreseeable future. For example, given his consistently 
low poll numbers notwithstanding an increasingly strong economy,250 it is at least plausible to 
imagine that President Trump’s reputation as the ultimate norm violator will contribute to his 
defeat in the 2020 Republican presidential primary or the general election. His prominence in the 
anticanon of exemplars of constitutional role morality may ultimately prompt more candidates 
for public office—Republicans and Democrats alike—to develop and deserve reputations for 
civility and civic virtue.251 The causes of polarization would not have changed, but the vision 
offered here would still seem more realistic than it may now.  
At the very least, one can imagine a fruitful agenda for the American Bar Association, the 
American Constitution Society, the Federalist Society, and patriotic, thoughtful liberals and 
conservatives in the legal profession. Operating behind a veil of ignorance about who would 
                                                                                                                                                       
showboat-fbi.html (“[F]or the first time, he explicitly referenced the F.B.I.’s investigation into his administration’s 
ties to Russia in defending Mr. Comey’s firing.”); Betsy Klein, Trump Slams Sessions, Rips DOJ in Twitter 
Outburst, CNN (July 24, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/25/politics/donald-trump-jeff-sessions-hillary-
clinton/index.html (“President Donald Trump lashed out at his attorney general and Justice Department in an 
extraordinary outburst on Twitter Tuesday morning, continuing his public shaming of Jeff Sessions while appearing 
to prod the nation’s top law enforcement official to investigate Hillary Clinton, his 2016 election opponent.”). 
247 See, e.g., Allan Smith, Alabama’s Republican Secretary of State—Who Voted for Roy Moore—Destroys 
“Voter Fraud” Claims in CNN Interview, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 28, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/alabama-
secretary-of-state-destroys-roy-moore-voter-fraud-2017-12). 
248 See Levitt, supra note 234, at 1853 (“[P]ublic officials with recognizable partisan affiliations can leave 
behind private tribal partisan impulses when acting in a public capacity, even when their self-interest is implicated. 
Indeed, our lived experience is that they not only can but repeatedly do, in daily official acts large and small, even 
when there are opportunities to behave otherwise.”); id. (“Some groups of officials have firmer norms against tribal 
partisanship than others, and these norms are stronger in some circumstances than others. But even the weaker end 
of the spectrum is stronger than conventional wisdom suggests.”). 
249  The first political transition—from the hitherto dominant Federalists to the ascendant Democratic 
Republicans—was so rocky in part because the Founders lacked many of the norms and conventions that manage 
political transitions today. And so when one side created judgeships at the last minute, the other side terminated 
them in likely contravention of Article III and canceled a Supreme Court term to postpone judicial resolution of the 
matter. For discussion of the crisis of 1800-1803, see generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING 
FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2007). 
250  See, e.g., Chris Cillizza, Donald Trump Is in a Very Bad Polling Place, CNN (Nov. 4, 2017), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/03/politics/trump-polling/index.html (“Of the 10 major national polls conducted over 
the past month, the highest – repeat: the highest – Trump’s approval rating has been is 38%. The lowest is 33%. 
Trump’s average approval rating over those 10 polls is 37.1%. His average disapproval? 57.1%.”).  
251 Cf., e.g., Greene, supra note 54 (discussing why certain judicial decisions have come to be regarded as 
“anticanonical”).       
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control the federal government at a certain future date, those organizations and individuals could 
work together to agree upon certain norms of conduct by elected officials in particular settings 
(for example, judicial nominations and confirmations), and to encourage reciprocity in adhering 
to those norms. The American Constitution Society is already interested in the topic of norms 
and conventions, as are some conservatives.252 Such a project would face a variety of obstacles 
in terms of both obtaining sufficient “buy in” and producing agreement on standards that are not 
so vague as to be meaningless. But doing nothing seems like a clearly inferior alternative. As for 
the criticism that the project is profoundly antidemocratic—that it is “the Establishment” 
imposing constraints on democracy—several points developed in this Article bear repeating: 
most Americans are not nearly as partisan as their representatives and the political class; role 
restraints are conducive to minority self-governance (and all Americans can expect to be on the 
losing end of elections in the years ahead); most Americans want the federal government to 
function reasonably well; and, in any event, successful democracies also require leadership.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Presidents and members of Congress are not federal judges, but nor are they as 
categorically distinct as most constitutional law scholars have tended to suppose. Such scholars 
expect judges to be restrained by a constitutional role morality that imposes obligations over and 
above legal obligations. It is time to expect the same of elected officials.  
This Article has been primarily concerned with justifying and inspiring efforts to 
articulate a constitutional role morality for elected officials of the federal government, not with 
completing this task on its own. It has grounded constitutional role morality in two purposes of 
the Constitution that law cannot fully accomplish on its own: the American conception of 
democracy as collective self-governance, and the perceived desirability, both historically and 
today, of a reasonably effective federal government. It has suggested for consideration some 
rhetorical, procedural, and substantive components of such a role morality. The Article has not 
focused on how to make its normative vision a reality, but it has suggested that, over the longer 
term, newer forms of civic education and law teaching may make some difference. More 
immediately and practically, demanding role restraints of elected officials can help license robust 
practices of political resistance to aggressive ideological agendas that politicians may seek to 
justify by invoking their victories on Election Day. 
Constitutional law scholars, along with scholars of legislation and the legal profession, 
can further develop the rhetorical, procedural, and substantive components of the role morality 
sketched here. Alternatively, they can explain why those suggestions ought to be rejected and a 
different set of role expectations adopted. It is difficult to know what potentially attractive role 
morality will be developed if legal scholars do not even try. What constitutional law scholars 
                                                
252 For example, William Kristol of The Weekly Standard participated enthusiastically on a plenary panel at 
the June 2017 ACS National Convention on the topic of norms and constitutional conventions. See ACS 2017 
National Convention Plenary: Norms, Conventions, and Constitutional Governance, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
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should not do is continue writing and teaching as if, as far as the U.S. Constitution is concerned, 
politicians are free to do whatever they want within the bounds of the law.  
Skeptics will no doubt ask—as they should—what incentives elected officials have to 
moderate their behavior beyond the demands of legality. They may also ask (rhetorically, this 
time) what, in the absence of such incentives, some “cackling” or, worse, preaching by law 
professors will ever accomplish.253 This Article may perhaps be described as cackling, but it is 
not a homily. It is, rather, an invitation to look at American political and constitutional 
arrangements from a different perspective than the usual one. The hope is that some 
constitutional law scholars and other legal academics will accept the invitation, and that some of 
them will then expand their beliefs about what is preferable—and even possible—in American 
politics. 
                                                
253 COLLINGWOOD, supra note 1, at 343.        
